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  Not all copying constitutes copyright infringement. Quite 
independent of fair use, copyright law requires that an act of copying 
be qualitatively and quantitatively significant enoughor 
“substantially similar”for it to be actionable. Originating in the 
nineteenth century, and entirely the creation of courts, copyright’s 
requirement of “substantial similarity” has thus far received little 
attention as an independently meaningful normative dimension of the 
copyright entitlement. This Article offers a novel theory for 
copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement by placing it firmly at 
the center of the institution and its various goals and purposes. As a 
common-law-style device that mirrors the functioning of other areas 
of private law, such as tort law, substantial similarity remains an 
unappreciated source of flexibility and pluralism in copyright law. It 
allows courts to modulate the copyright entitlement’s operational 
robustness by altering the amount of exclusivity that a work obtains, 
based on different criteria, and thereby introduces “thickness” as an 
altogether new dimension of the entitlement. It also renders the 
adjudication of copyright infringement overtly pluralistic by 
sequencing the introduction of incommensurable values into the 
inquiry in a particular, reasoned order. As a mechanism of conceptual 
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sequencing—a multicriterion decision-making process long known to 
the common law—substantial similarity allows copyright law to 
affirm both utilitarian and personality-based considerations, while 
prioritizing the former over the latter systemically. Viewing copyright 
law through the lens of substantial similarity sheds new light on the 
compatibility of the institution’s goals and purposes, copyright’s 
structure as a “property” right, and the role of courts within its overall 
scheme. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In their exuberance to describe copyright as a form of 
intellectual “property,” courts and scholars all too easily ignore what 
is perhaps copyright law’s singular identifying structural attribute: its 
emphasis on copying.1 Dating back to its origins, copyright law has 
operated principally by granting its holder the exclusive right to copy 
a creative work of authorship, and actions for copyright infringement 
have ever since revolved entirely around a showing of copying.2 
Although the scope of what copying entails and extends 
todistribution, performance, adaptation, and the likehas no 
doubt expanded over time, it remains equally true that copying, in 
one form or another, remains the true sine qua non of copyright law.3 
Perhaps more importantly, to the extent that copyright law’s 
emphasis on copying is ever analyzed and compared to other 
intellectual property regimes, it is done so in its evidentiary, or 
probative, dimension.4 Proof of copying is really thought to represent 
the extent of the institution’s engagement with the idea of copying.5 
 
 1. For an extensive discussion of the propertarian turn in copyright law, identifying its 
causes and effects, see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 154–68 (2008); 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1132–42 
(2009).  
 2. For an early instantiation of this idea in the first copyright statute, see An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.), which granted authors the sole right 
and liberty of “printing” written work. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 
(amended). 
 3. Nimmer on Copyright, MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT (2012), describes the “copying” requirement as both an extrinsic and intrinsic 
limitation on the rights of the copyright owner, see 2 id. § 8.01[A] (“[A]bsent copying, there can 
be no infringement of copyright.” (footnote omitted)); see also William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 344 (1989) 
(recognizing the fact that “copyright merely gives protection against copying” as a principal 
feature of copyright law). 
 4. For the leading account in this area, see generally Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” 
as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1187 (1990). Professor Latman’s point was that this focus on copying as a purely probative 
inquiry was misplaced and obscured the reality that the question of copying had important 
additional dimensions. Id. at 1189–90. 
 5. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 480–82 (2006); Michael K. Erickson, Comment, Emphasizing the Copy 
in Copyright: Why Noncopying Alterations Do Not Prepare Infringing Derivative Works, 2005 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1261, 1297. The literature trying to understand the copyright-patent divergence 
in terms of information costs also focuses primarily on the probative dimension of copyright’s 
copying requirement and its independent-creation defense. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs 
in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 526 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property 
as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1810 (2007). 
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What this view inevitably ignores is the fact that copyright law’s 
emphasis on copying has a large, underappreciated normative 
dimension to it, one that derives from copyright law’s somewhat 
counterintuitive recognition that “not all copying, however, is 
copyright infringement.”6 Importantly, this normative question bears 
no connection whatsoever to the fair-use doctrine, a doctrine which 
operates as a defense to infringement rather than as a component of 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case.7 Instead, it comes into playat least in 
theoryin every single judicial determination of copyright 
infringement, through the requirement of “substantial similarity.”8 
In a copyright-infringement suit, the plaintiff is required to prove 
that the defendant “copied” the protected work.9 Although this 
burden of proof has a clear factual element to it, that is, whether the 
defendant had access to the work and actually copied it,10 it entails 
much more. Copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement steps in 
here. Substantial similarity is a judicially created rule that places the 
burden to establish that the defendant’s copying is actionable as a 
legal proposition on the plaintiff in a copyright-infringement suit, 
even when the copying is shown to exist as a factual matter.11 The 
defendant’s copying thus must be shown to be improper or wrongful 
in order to be actionable.12 The substantial-similarity analysis has 
courts focus entirely on the significance of the similarity between the 
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works for their assessment of 
actionability.13 Unsurprisingly, this inquiry inevitably entails the 
conscious introduction of a large normative/evaluative dimension into 
the analysis of the entitlement. The more quantitatively and 
qualitatively significant the borrowing by the defendant, the more 
likely it is that the copying will be considered improper, and hence 
actionable.14 This Article advances a theory of copyright’s analytical 
structure that places its emphasis on copying—as a normative 
matter—at the center of the institution. 
 
 6. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 7. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05.  
 8. Id. § 13.01[B].  
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. § 13.02[A] (discussing the access requirement).  
 11. Id. § 13.03[A]. 
 12. Id. § 13.01[B].  
 13. ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW § 1:1 (2010). 
 14. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[A]. 
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Copyright law’s analysis of copying is usually carried out in two 
distinct steps.15 In the first step, the court examines the plaintiff’s 
work, determines what parts of it are eligible for copyright protection 
(a process referred to as “dissection”16), and looks to the defendant’s 
work to see if the protected parts were indeed copied. This step is 
often referred to as the step of “probative similarity,” or as the 
“extrinsic test,” and the focus here is entirely on whether the 
defendant copied protected material from the plaintiff’s work as a 
factual matter.17 Very importantly, at the conclusion of this step, and 
based on its examination of the plaintiff’s work, the court fixes the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied during its assessment of the 
actionability of the defendant’s copying. Here the court effectively 
determines the thickness of protection to which the work is entitled 
under copyright law.18 Thickness operates as a direct measure of the 
copyright entitlement’s exclusionary robustness. The thicker the 
entitlement, the greater the forms and types of copying that are likely 
to be actionable; conversely, the thinner the entitlement, the fewer 
the forms and types of copying that are considered actionable. 
 
 15. See Ringgold v. BET, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing two different steps: 
“proof of copying” and “determining that the degree of similarity suffices to demonstrate 
actionable infringement”); OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 1:1; Mark A. Lemley, 
Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement (pt. 1), 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
719, 721–23 (2010). 
 16. E.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 17. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing the “extrinsic test” as a test that “depends not on the responses 
of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed”), superseded on 
other grounds by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, ch. 5, § 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); Latman, supra note 4, at 1204 
(describing “probative similarity” as focusing on “facts probative of copying”). 
 18. It is worth noting that courts do not generally use the term “thickness” themselves. 
They nonetheless do routinely describe an entitlement as “thin.” E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 
914 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts also occasionally refer to entitlements as “thick.” See Fleener v. 
Trinity Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“[Books] are accorded 
‘thick’ copyright protection.”). For early identifiable scholarly uses of “thickness” as a variable 
in light of these usages by courts, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the 
Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 859 n.42, 884–87 
(2004); Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using 
Creative Motivation To Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008); Eric Setliff, 
Copyright and Industrial Design: An “Alternative Design” Alternative, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
49, 77 (2006).  
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Thickness thus sets the requisite level of similarity that needs to be 
found for the copying to be deemed actionable.19 
In the second step, referred to as the substantial-similarity 
analysis, the court applies the level of scrutiny, i.e., thickness, so 
chosen to its analysis of the two works—the original and the 
defendant’s copy—to determine whether the copying does indeed rise 
to the level of an infringement.20 Although no doubt a factual 
determination, this step operates as a subjective evaluation of the 
different parts of the two works and of their relative contributions to 
the overall significance of the work, both as a quantitative and 
qualitative matter, in order to assess whether the copying amounted 
to a “wrong.”21 It is carried out using the level of scrutiny chosen by 
the court for the work at the end of the first step. 
As should be apparent, even though the determination of the 
entitlement’s thickness technically occurs prior to the substantial-
similarity analysis, the former informs the latter in large measure. The 
substantial-similarity inquiry thus in reality involves two elements of 
its own: the thickness determination, and the similarity analysis. The 
similarity analysis operates as a comparison of the two works, while 
the thickness analysis determines how substantial the similarity needs 
to be during the comparison. Disaggregating copyright law’s analysis 
of substantial similarity in this manner reveals the process to be an 
unappreciated source of structural and substantive nuance in 
copyright law. 
First, it introduces a good deal of flexibility into the copyright 
entitlement. By allowing the court to set the appropriate level of 
“thickness” of the entitlement for each protected work on a case-by-
case basis, it injects a large amount of flexibility and context-sensitive 
tailoring into copyright’s adjudication process. Copyright law has long 
been thought to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to creativity by 
offering creative expression exclusionary protection for the same 
amount of time and through the same or at best, similar, bundle of 
exclusive rights.22 Focusing on thickness reveals that this is only half of 
the story, because courts inject an altogether new dimension into the 
 
 19. For a further explanation of thickness, see infra Part I.B. 
 20. See, e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (“If copying is established, then only does there arise 
the second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation).”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 875 (2006). 
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entitlement-delineation process in traditional common-law fashion; 
indeed, a dimension that copyright’s extensive reliance on real-
property analogies fails to capture altogether.23 Contrary to common 
belief then, courts thus play a central role in framing and delineating 
the copyright entitlement. 
Second, it also converts copyright adjudication into a 
multicriterial decision-making process by allowing incommensurable, 
plural values to inform the analysis sequentially. As noted previously, 
the substantial-similarity analysis enables the introduction of a large 
normative component into the infringement inquiryboth in the 
choice of framework for scrutiny, and in the actual application of that 
framework to the works being compared. In determining the 
“thickness” of the copyright entitlement—that is, the level of scrutiny 
to be applied in the analysis—courts actively examine the creative 
work through the rubric of copyright’s overall utilitarian goals and 
purposes, as manifested in numerous internal devices. Thus, the more 
creative, original, or expressive the work, the thicker the copyright 
entitlement over it.24 Indeed, this process of connecting the thickness 
of the entitlement to the institution’s overall utilitarian goals received 
the direct approbation of the Supreme Court two decades ago. In 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,25 a decision 
best known for its analysis of copyright’s originality requirement, the 
Court expressly noted that works that served copyright’s primary 
purpose only marginally should obtain no more than “thin” 
protection.26 Conversely, by implication, works that furthered this 
central purpose more directly, such as highly original or creative 
works, were to obtain thicker protection. The thickness prong of the 
 
 23. For a discussion of copyright’s extensive use of real-property analogies and its effect on 
the doctrine, see Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1138. 
 24. To be sure, no court has looked beyond originality and functionality as the variables 
that dictate the thickness analysis. But there seems to be little reason for courts to limit 
themselves in this manner. See generally Dale P. Olson, Thin Copyrights, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 
147–48 (1992) (describing the Feist decision and speculating that it will result in the 
development of a “thin” copyright doctrine, based entirely on a work’s originality). For recent 
work arguing that courts should extend the idea to an analysis of a creator’s economic motives, 
see Loren, supra note 18, at 36, which argues that “[c]ourts should expand their inquiry and 
consider the primary motivation for the creation and distribution of the type of work at issue as 
relevant to the degree of similarity required in order to infringe a particular work.” 
 25. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 26. Id. at 349. For other courts’ use of the term “thin,” see Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 
812 (9th Cir. 2003); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003); Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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analysis thus allows the entitlement to be calibrated to copyright’s 
utilitarian values in direct, scalar terms. 
In applying the standard of scrutiny chosen and assessing the 
similarity of the two works, the analysis then has courts examine 
whether the defendant’s copying took elements of “essence” and 
“value” from the work27—in effect asking whether the copying 
extended to parts of the work that were likely most meaningful to its 
creator. As should be apparent, this inquiry begins to resemble an 
inquiry into the connection between the creator and the work, 
reminiscent of personality-based, or droit d’auteur, deontic interests 
in copyright law.28 What is most interesting, though, is that the two 
stages operate independently, yet in an ordered sequence—which 
allows the two values, that is, utilitarian and personality-based ones, 
to enter the picture without having to be traded off directly.29 
Far from representing an ad hoc process then, the two-staged 
substantial-similarity analysis is a mechanism that allows copyright 
law to accommodate otherwise conflicting values into its functioning. 
American copyright law has long prided itself on being wedded to an 
avowedly utilitarian theory of providing creators with efficient 
market-based incentives to create.30 Personhood-based or analogous 
deontic theories—which focus on the connection between creator and 
work and the nonutilitarian motivations for creativity—are thought to 
be of little-to-no significance in the overall functioning of the system, 
largely because they are thought of as incapable of coexisting with the 
institution’s utilitarian focus.31 A closer scrutiny of substantial 
similarity tells us that this may not be the case after all. 
Indeed, the problem of incommensurability that lies at the heart 
of the utilitarian-deontic divide in copyright law can be understood as 
 
 27. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2:4; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 3, § 13.03[A][1] (describing comprehensive nonliteral similarity as examining whether the 
“fundamental essence” was duplicated). 
 28. See HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 538 (1978); Rudolf Monta, The 
Concept of “Copyright” Versus the “Droit D’Auteur,” 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 178 (1959) (“For 
the French the droit d’auteur is the most personal of all properties because it is the creation of 
the mind, and this droit d’auteur has its origin and justification in the very fact of the intellectual 
creation.”). 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1990); Monta, supra note 28, at 185.  
 31. See Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 992. 
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an instance of the “voting paradox,” first identified by Condorcet32 
and made famous by Professor Kenneth Arrow in developing his 
theory of social choice.33 In his Nobel Prize-winning work, Arrow 
showed that it is impossible to design a coherent system of 
aggregating the votes of multiple individuals that respects their 
unanimous preferences.34 Arrow’s “impossibility theorem” came in 
due course to be applied to other types of decision making that 
sought to synthesize multiple criteria into a single decision—when the 
same problem with synthesizing the preferences of individual voters 
presented itself in identical fashion, as well as when individual voters 
were simply replaced by independent criteria.35 One such 
fundamental problem was that the introduction of a new criterion for 
the decision altered people’s preferences, producing an intransitivity 
in the ordering.36 The problem of synthesizing copyright’s utilitarian 
objectives and individual personality-based ones into a single 
outcome can be understood as presenting the same kind of paradox 
as that seen in social-choice contexts. A decision to protect based 
exclusively on utilitarian considerations could pull in one direction, 
while one based on personality criteria might pull in the opposite 
direction. 
Consider the following example: da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is an 
extremely original, creative, and expressive work of art. Measured in 
purely utilitarian terms, it is precisely the kind of work the copyright 
system would want to encourage, and therefore merits the widest 
possible protection available.37 The essence and genius of da Vinci’s 
work in Mona Lisa is thought to lie in its depiction of the model, and 
 
 32. See JEAN-ANTOINE-NICOLAS CARITAT DE CONDORCET, ESSAI SUR L’APPLICATION 
DE L’ANALYSE À LA PROBABILIT´E DES D´ECISIONS RENDUES À LA PLURALIT´E DES VOIX 
(1785). 
 33. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 93 (1963).  
 34. Id. at 96–103; LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 5–7 (2011).  
 35. See KENNETH ARROW & HERVÉ RAYNAUD, SOCIAL CHOICE AND MULTICRITERION 
DECISION-MAKING 18–23 (1986).  
 36. For a demonstration of the idea, see Reinold H. Van Til, Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem, 126 DE ECONOMIST 84, 93–96 (1978). In social-choice theory, this is referred to as the 
axiom of the “independence of irrelevant alternatives.” See Paramesh Ray, Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives, 41 ECONOMETRICA 987 (1973). 
 37. Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (holding that a 
factual compilation, with little original expression, would receive the thinnest copyright 
protection). 
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her facial and bodily features in overtly subtle fashion.38 Now assume 
that another artist, Salvador Dalí, creates a portrait, but of a 
completely different person—say himself—with completely different 
facial and bodily features. Yet his final portrait, which he titles Self 
Portrait as Mona Lisa, copies some of the background hills from the 
Mona Lisa. Assuming that copyright in da Vinci’s work hadn’t 
already expired, from a personality point of view we would argue that 
Dalí’s artwork doesn’t infringe on da Vinci’s, because it didn’t copy 
parts of the Mona Lisa that da Vinci can be said to have invested his 
creative personality into.39 The problem now becomes one of 
reconciling copyright’s commitment to its utilitarian criteria, which 
would favor da Vinci—and find liability—with the personality ideal, 
which would favor Dalí—and find no liability. 
To solve similar problems of incommensurability that flow from 
multicriterion decision making in other parts of the common law, 
scholars have relied on a mechanism known as “conceptual 
sequencing,” in which plural and incommensurable values are 
admitted into the calculus in a temporally ordered sequence.40 Instead 
of requiring the decision maker to weigh and balance them against 
each other, or to choose some criteria over others, it enables the 
decision maker to accord different values varying but nonnegligible 
importance in the overall calculus, based on the order in which they 
are considered during the adjudication. It partitions the inquiry into 
multiple steps based on the independent criteria in question, 
prioritizes the steps to reflect the relative importance of the criteria, 
and forces decision making to follow the order, thereby cabining the 
considerations at each stage. In the process, the final entitlement 
comes to derive from multiple values and tends to vary contextually 
to reflect this reality.41 
The two elements of substantial similarity can be understood as 
copyright law’s multicriterial mechanism of conceptual sequencing. 
 
 38. See generally Bruno Mottin, Reading the Image, in JEAN-PIERRE MOHEN ET AL., 
MONA LISA: INSIDE THE PAINTING 64, 70 (2006) (cataloguing minute details of the model that 
“vibrate in the light and quiver at the slightest breath of wind”). 
 39. See infra Part II.A. 
 40. For prominent examples, see Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and 
Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487, 1492 (1998), which analogizes 
conceptual sequencing in the law to a committee ordering certain values when selecting students 
for academic scholarships, and Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA 
L. REV. 621, 625 (2002), which argues that the separate values of deterrence and corrective 
justice in tort law can be reconciled through conceptual sequencing. 
 41. Chapman, supra note 40, at 1496–1507. 
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The thickness step has courts evaluate the abstract entitlement 
exclusively in rule-utilitarian terms, while the similarity determination 
allows courts to consider only interpersonal deontic considerations. 
The substantial-similarity sequence can thus be appreciated as 
copyright law’s attempt to deal with the paradox of inconsistent 
preferences across different criteria, which lies at the heart of social-
choice theory. Going back to our hypothetical then, it would allow a 
court to accord da Vinci the thickest possible protection at first and in 
the abstract, and then in the next step find that Dalí’s copying is not 
similar enough to merit liability. 
Copyright’s substantial-similarity analysis has long troubled 
courts and scholars. Although many have argued for its modification, 
retrenchment, and even wholesale abandonment, few have discerned 
any logic in its working.42 Understanding it in terms of social-choice 
theory and in terms of the paradox of incommensurability that 
accompanies multicriterial decision making, allows us to make perfect 
sense of a part of copyright law that has long been deemed an 
impenetrable jungle. This Article thus develops a theory of 
substantial similarity in copyright law that is both positive and 
normative. Premised on the idea that copyright law can indeed learn 
from the mechanisms and processes of decision making that have long 
been employed in different common-law contexts in which plural and 
often conflicting values have long coexisted through techniques of 
judicial reasoning,43 this Article argues for a more ambitious, 
constructive role for copyright’s substantial-similarity inquiry. 
Part I begins with the descriptive. It starts by unpacking the idea 
of substantial similarity. Part I.A first examines how courts use 
substantial similarity as a largely normative inquiry under which they 
assess the wrongfulness of a defendant’s copying. Part I.B then sets 
out different formulations of substantial similarity that vary in 
stringency, that is, the idea of thickness. Part I.C describes the 
alteration in the criteria that thickness entails, and Part I.D finally 
analyzes the flexibility that this process affords courts in tailoring 
copyright’s entitlement structure. This Part makes the claim that the 
substantial-similarity inquiry represents an important structural 
 
 42. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 15, at 719 (arguing for retrenchment of substantial 
similarity); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 683, 738–40 (2012) (arguing for its abolition). 
 43. For an elaboration of this argument in the context of state intellectual-property 
regimes, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law 
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1550 (2010). 
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dimension of the copyright entitlement, and that despite its seemingly 
confusing nature, it remains analytically and normatively rich, a 
feature that allows courts to inject a meaningful degree of variability 
into crafting copyright’s individual entitlement. 
Part II then focuses on how the substantial-similarity inquiry, 
when meaningfully employed, can serve to mediate plural values 
within copyright law. The argument here moves from the descriptive 
to the normative. Part II.A begins by setting out the ideas of 
“conceptual sequencing” and “defeasible” rules that have long been 
employed in numerous areas of the common law as mechanisms of 
pluralistic adjudication. Part II.B, by describing how different kinds of 
valuesutilitarian and rights basedcan be allowed into the calculus 
at different stages of the inquiry, shows how the substantial-similarity 
analysis ought to be understood as a mechanism of conceptual 
sequencing. 
Part III then sets out some of the important structural and 
functional advantages that are likely to flow from viewing substantial 
similarity as a mechanism of conceptually sequencing 
incommensurable values in copyright law, including its ability to 
prioritize utilitarian values over deontic ones, its bifurcation of 
upstream and downstream guidance, its likely injection of added 
clarity and candor into copyright decision making, and perhaps most 
importantly, the likelihood that it will indirectly result in a more 
coherent framework for the fair-use doctrine. Part IV then illustrates 
how courts might apply the analysis in practice, using a landmark 
copyright decision that has for decades received sustained criticism 
from scholars for its sloppy reasoning: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enterprises.44 Analyzing the case through the framework of 
substantial similarity reveals that even if the Court’s final decision 
had remained the same, its use of substantial similarity might have 
rendered its reasoning more defensible. 
I.  “SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY” IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
Discussions of copyright’s structural dimensions very often 
ignore the reality that copyright law is essentially about copying.45 
Unlike patent law, which treats a defendant’s mere use of a protected 
invention as an act of patent infringement, copyright infringement is 
 
 44. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 45. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005). 
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predicated on a defendant’s act of copying.46 Yet copying, or the act of 
appropriation that copyright law cares about, is both factual and 
normative. On the one hand, copyright law looks for the existence of 
“actual copying,” borne out by a defendant’s access to the protected 
work and other circumstantial evidence.47 Beyond that, however, 
copyright law also insists that the copying so proven to exist be shown 
to be “improper,” “unlawful,” “illicit,” or “wrongful.”48 As a 
normative inquiry, copyright’s doctrinal device for establishing 
wrongful copying is the idea of “substantial similarity.” 
Copyright law’s requirement of substantial similarity is in many 
ways more open-ended than the fair-use doctrine. Unlike fair use, 
which today finds mention in the Copyright Act of 1976,49 substantial 
similarity continues to remain a doctrine that is policed, enforced, and 
molded entirely by courts.50 In this respect it is perhaps more 
common-law-like than fair use, with courts often finding themselves 
completely free to adapt the doctrine to new contexts and 
technological developments.51 While many continue to criticize its 
intrinsic open-endedness, little consideration has been paid to the 
virtues that this flexibility might afford courts in shaping the 
structural and substantive dimensions of the copyright entitlement.52 
This Part describes the substantial-similarity inquiry, situating it 
within the common-law tradition internal to copyright adjudication. 
Part I.A begins by setting out what copyright’s substantial-similarity 
inquiry is and the different steps that it entails. Part I.B goes on to 
show how courts have over the years come to employ its open-
endedness to effectively create a new dimension to the copyright 
 
 46. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 126, 475–76 (4th rev. ed. 2007). 
 47. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.02[A]. 
 48. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467–73 (2d Cir. 1946); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 3, § 13.03[A]. 
 49. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 50. See id. § 107 (2006) (codifying fair use).  
 51. For an extension to the context of computer software, see Computer Associates 
International Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992), which developed the well-
known “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test, id. 
 52. For criticisms of substantial similarity’s open-endedness, see generally Amy B. Cohen, 
Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 719 (1987); Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial 
Similarity Down to Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181 (1993); Jarrod M. Mohler, Toward a Better 
Understanding of Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971 
(2000).  
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entitlement, measured by the amount of exclusivity a work is 
granted—the rubric of “thickness”—which they use to set the 
standard of scrutiny to be employed in their analysis of the similarity 
between the works. Part I.C then analyzes how courts operationalize 
the thickness they choose during their actual comparison of the 
works, which constitutes their examination of the wrongfulness of the 
defendant’s copying. Finally, Part I.D explores the underappreciated 
opportunity that the substantial-similarity inquiry gives courts to 
minimize copyright law’s uniformity costs. 
A. Disaggregating “Copying” 
Going beyond proof of copying, the requirement of substantial 
similarity has courts ask whether a defendant’s copying is 
quantitatively and qualitatively “enough” to be rendered actionable.53 
Its origins can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, around 
the same time when the fair-use doctrine began to take shape. 
Around this time, courts in copyright cases began examining the 
extent, “value,” and qualitative significance of what the defendant 
had copied from a protected work as part of their infringement 
analysis.54 The copying thus had to be substantial, in the sense that it 
related to what was qualitatively significant in the plaintiff’s work. 
It wasn’t until the early twentieth century, however, that courts 
came to acknowledge its independent role in the infringement 
analysis. This process began with the Second Circuit recognizing that 
the test for infringement necessarily involved a subjective, context-
specific inquiry that was vague rather than mechanistic.55 It thus 
entailed confronting the question of when and under what 
circumstances a defendant’s copying ought to be considered 
problematic, and whether the copying was “substantial.”56 In Arnstein 
v. Porter,57 the court formally affirmed this reality when it bifurcated 
the question of copying into two independent steps.58 In the first, the 
court is to assess the similarities between the works in order to draw 
an inference of actual copying.59 Occasionally referred to as the 
 
 53. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 1:1. 
 54. See, e.g., Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1138 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552); Folsom v. 
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 55. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 56. Id. at 121. 
 57. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 58. Id. at 468. 
 59. Id.   
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question of “probative similarity,” this relates largely to the question 
of copying as a factual matter.60 In the second step, the court is to 
determine if the copying so shown to exist is itself “improper,” 
“unlawful,” or “illicit.”61 Although both steps are structured as factual 
inquiries, the second step involves the court determining whether an 
ordinary observer of the two works would deem the appropriation 
“wrongful.”62 All the same, the basis of this wrongfulness remains 
largely subjective, even though it is connected to the works 
themselves. 
The bifurcation that the court set out in Arnstein is far from 
simple. To prove actual copying via probative similarity, the court’s 
test involves looking for the existence of access (on the part of the 
defendant to the protected work) and actual similarities between the 
protectible parts of the two works.63 In this latter part of the test, often 
referred to as the process of “dissection,” courts are permitted to 
make use of experts in a given area of creativity to detect patterns of 
similarity and difference between the works and to assess what parts 
are original to either.64 After this part of the test is satisfied and the 
court concludes that there was indeed copying of protected material, 
it moves on to the question of unlawful copying, or substantial 
similarity.65 Yet, here the Arnstein test does not allow a court to make 
use of expert testimony.66 The court is instead to put itself in the 
position of an ordinary observer.67 In applying the ordinary-observer 
test, a court usually undertakes an assessment of the overall similarity 
between the two works, rather than a component-by-component 
comparison.68 It examines the “quantity” and “quality” of what the 
defendant’s work appropriated from the plaintiff’s as part of this 
 
 60. The term “probative similarity” was coined by Professor Alan Latman. Latman, supra 
note 4, at 1189–90. 
 61. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468; OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.1.  
 62. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (“The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from 
plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the 
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated 
something which belongs to the plaintiff.”). 
 63. Id. at 468. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. For a recent criticism of this variation, arguing that substantial similarity should be 
tried to a jury instead of being evaluated by experts, see generally Lemley, supra note 15.  
 67. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 68. See, e.g., Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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examination.69 Although the quantitative aspect is fairly 
straightforward, on the qualitative side the test has the court examine 
whether the defendant’s copying took material of essence and value 
from a plaintiff’s work.70 The logic behind this approach to the 
qualitative element is thought to lie in copyright’s avowed goal of 
protecting a creator’s value in the work.71 Focusing on the 
preservation of this value is thus allowed to inform the question of 
substantiality. Essence and value are of course subjective indicators, 
which in turn allow the test to vary from one setting to another, and 
which, in the absence of expert testimony, can result in 
determinations that a court considers to be intuitively correct. 
Three decades after the formulation of the Arnstein test by the 
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit modified the test into its own two-
stage approach.72 In this variation, step one entails the court merely 
examining whether there exists any similarity between the ideas 
underlying the two works. Referred to as the “extrinsic test,” here 
too, the process allows for the use of expert testimony and analytic 
dissection.73 In the second step, the “intrinsic” one, the court gets to 
the question of substantial similarity by examining the similarity in 
expression between the two works, and it asks whether the total 
concept and feel of the two works are substantially similar.74 Here, 
much like the Arnstein test, the court is to adopt the standard of an 
“ordinary reasonable person” and eschew any reliance on outside 
testimony or analytic dissection.75 Most courts across the country 
follow one of these two approaches.76 
It is worth reiterating that neither of these approaches is 
particularly straightforward. Numerous courts, regardless of which 
approach they have adopted, have routinely conflated the two steps 
 
 69. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2:4; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 
342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (“[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, 
look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials 
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work.”). 
 70. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2.4.  
 71. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 72. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 1977) superseded on other grounds by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, ch. 5, 
§ 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1167. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
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of the inquiryunder the singular rubric of “substantial 
similarity”and in the process elided the all-important distinction 
between “actual” and “improper” copying.77 
In applying the second part of either test, courts tend to fluctuate 
in determining who the “ordinary” person is—the hypothetical 
individual through whose eyes the analysis is to be carried out. One 
approach adopts a layperson standard, seemingly agnostic to any 
purpose underlying the formulation.78 Another approach treats the 
ordinary person as a member of the “intended audience.”79 In general, 
courts following the extrinsic-intrinsic approach to substantial 
similarity follow an intended-audience approach, whereas those 
adhering to the traditional Arnstein formulation use a layperson 
standard.80 
The logic for using an intended-audience approach in 
determining who the ordinary observer is derives from the belief that 
copyright’s primary purpose lies in preventing copying only when it 
results in the creation of close substitutes that are in turn likely to 
divert demand away from the original.81 The intended audience is 
thought to represent the threshold for such substitutability and 
diversion, and courts thus use it to evaluate the possibility of 
economic harm. Indeed, some courts have expressly stated as much in 
explaining their preference for an intended-audience approach over a 
layperson one.82 Although some have commended the intended-
 
 77. See, e.g., Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing 
substantial similarity); Murray Hill Publ’ns v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 
316–21 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587–88 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); 
Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); see also Latman, 
supra note 4, at 1189–91 (same); Lemley, supra note 15, at 720–22 (discussing improper and 
illicit appropriation). 
 78. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 722–26 (providing examples of the “ordinary observer” 
test). 
 79. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:2.2[A] (describing a test that 
“seek[s] to gauge the reaction of the intended audience of the works” rather than that of any lay 
observer); Lemley, supra note 15, at 729–30. 
 80. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 724–26 (explaining how different circuit courts approach 
the issue); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (describing the layperson 
standard).  
 81. See Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright 
Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 144–45 (1988) (“If, as Arnstein suggested, 
copyright law should protect the plaintiff’s interest in potential financial returns, the ultimate 
test for infringement should consider specifically the response of the market from which those 
returns would derive.”).  
 82. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733–34 (4th Cir. 1990) (“In light of the 
copyright law’s purpose of protecting a creator’s market, we think it sensible to embrace 
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audience approach for its avowed attempt to connect substantial 
similarity to copyright’s underlying market-based justification, the 
approach eliminates from the inquiry other variables that might go 
into a more holistic assessment of the impropriety or unlawfulness of 
the defendant’s copying.83 The value of a work to the copyright holder 
might, for instance, be diminished by the creation of complementary, 
rather than substitutive, copies in certain instances.84 In this situation, 
it is unlikely that a focus on the narrow market for the protected work 
is likely to adequately capture the concerns at stake. 
All the same, adopting an intended-audience approach instead of 
the default ordinary-observer one does not seem to actually alter the 
underlying content of the inquiry in any significant manner. Courts 
have said surprisingly little about the factors that are meant to go into 
a fact finder’s individualized assessment of whether the similarity is 
substantial. Any discussion of the actual standard by courts tends to 
be framed in largely prudential language. Courts thus emphasize the 
following: that the standard is meant “to gauge the reaction of the 
ordinary ‘man on the street’ to the two works”;85 that the test is the 
“overall similarities” between the two works;86 that it is to entail an 
examination of both “quantitative” and “qualitative” elements; that a 
decision maker is to consider factors such as the amount of creativity 
and originality involved, in addition to the nature of the protected 
material and the setting in which it appears;87 and that the reaction of 
the ordinary observer being considered should be “spontaneous” and 
“immediate.”88 It is not readily apparent that these observations do 
much to focus the actual determination. Other than pointing to the 
reality that the determination is to derive primarily from a 
comparison of the works themselves and is to be carried out in a 
nonmechanical fashion, these observations seem to add very little 
when viewed in the abstract. 
 
Arnstein’s command that the ultimate comparison of the works at issue be oriented toward the 
works’ intended audience.”). 
 83. See Lape, supra note 52, at 198–99. For a criticism of this approach, suggesting its 
incompatibility with the Supreme Court’s observations in Feist, see 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 3, § 13.03[E][1][a]. 
 84. For more on this, see infra Part II.B.2. 
 85. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.1[A].  
 86. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 87. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 88. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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To sum up then, copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement 
does not merely entail a comparison of the two works to find the 
existence of actual copying. It involves a large normative component 
in which courts are to judge the wrongfulness of a defendant’s act of 
copying, once shown to exist. Although this wrongfulness is filtered 
through a comparison of the works themselves, the variables that 
influence it remain subjective and couched in terms of a layperson or 
ordinary-observer standard. Copying is thought to be actionable 
under the requirement only when it reaches certain quantitative and 
qualitative thresholds; yet, the bases for those thresholds remains 
fairly diverse, allowing courts to infuse these thresholds with largely 
intuitive notions of when an appropriation is to be considered 
wrongful and therefore actionable. 
B. An Intermediate Step: The Idea of “Thickness” 
Substantial similarity thus operates as an evaluation of the 
defendant’s copying, which a court or fact finder uses to assess the 
wrongfulness of the copying and, consequently, its actionability. The 
ordinary-observer standard operates along the lines of tort law’s 
reasonable-person requirement, creating a legal fiction through which 
the wrongfulness of the action in question is assessed.89 Yet the 
requirement’s complexity does not end there. Courts have come to 
develop a few well-known variations of the doctrine in an effort to 
account for the great variety of creativity that receives protection 
under copyright law. This is how the idea of thickness begins to take 
shape. 
Copyright protection has long been available only for works that 
are deemed original.90 But copyright law has struggled to develop a 
meaningful basis by which to operationalize its originality 
requirement.91 Recognizing this difficulty, courts have come to use 
substantial similarity’s ordinary-observer test as a means by which to 
vary the protection that different works receive depending on their 
level of originality. Works that are made up entirely of original and 
creative expression continue to receive protection via the traditional 
 
 89. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 90. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991).  
 91. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1506 (2009) 
(“Copyright law fails to . . . calibrate the scope of the copyright protection to the degree of the 
work’s originality.”). 
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substantial-similarity requirement, and with it the ordinary-observer 
or intended-audience test.92 On the other hand, when it comes to 
works that contain unoriginal expression in addition to original 
expression, most courts raise the standard of scrutiny needed to 
establish that the copying was wrongful.93 They do so by examining 
the similarity between the works using a “‘more discerning ordinary 
observer’ test.”94 Beyond originality, courts adopt a similar approach 
when trying to distinguish between the idea and the expression 
underlying a work when the two are partially merged,95 or in 
attempting to eliminate other unprotectible elements from the 
comparison.96 
In this approach, the fact finder begins by identifying the 
unprotectible elements of the work as before, i.e., as part of the 
dissection exercise.97 It then requires examining whether the works 
are substantially similar when compared as a whole under the 
ordinary-observer standard. Yet in so doing, the fact finder is meant 
to pay closer attention than previously to the protectible elements in 
the work, control for the influence of the nonprotectible elements, 
assess the contribution of the former to the substance and value of the 
 
 92. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]here the plaintiff’s 
work contains no material imported from the public domain, the ‘more discerning’ test is 
unnecessary.” (quoting Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 101–02 (2d Cir. 1999))). 
 93. See id. (“[A] ‘more refined analysis’ is required where a plaintiff’s work is not ‘wholly 
original,’ but rather incorporates elements from the public domain.” (quoting Key Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991))). 
 94. R. Ready Prods., Inc. v. Cantrell, 85 F. Supp. 2d 672, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (quoting 
Hamil, 193 F.3d at 101–02, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 
65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hamil, 193 F.3d at 101 (“This 
[more discerning ordinary-observer] test is applied when a work contains both protectible and 
unprotectible elements, and requires the court to eliminate the unprotectible elements from its 
consideration and to ask whether the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially 
similar.” (quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991))); Folio 
Impressions, 937 F.2d at 766 (“[S]ince only some of the design enjoys copyright protection, the 
observer’s attention must be more discerning.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here 
we compare products that contain both protectible and unprotectible elements, our inspection 
must be ‘more discerning’; we must attempt to extract the unprotectible elements from our 
consideration . . . .”). 
 96. See Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]here a design 
contains both protectible and unprotectible elements, we have held that the observer’s 
inspection must be more ‘discerning,’ ignoring those aspects of a work that are unprotectible in 
making the comparison.” (quoting Folio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 765–66)). 
 97. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003 (“Having narrowed the scope of the copyright, we applied 
the ‘more discerning’ ordinary-observer test and compared only the protected portion of the 
design . . . .”). 
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work, and then determine whether the defendant’s copying was 
wrongful—a more “discerning” standard of scrutiny.98 
Some courts take this approach one step further and adopt a 
sliding-scale approach to the ordinary-observer standard. They thus 
acknowledge that there is a range of protection available to 
copyrighted works that depends entirely on the amount of originality 
that the work satisfies.99 The more original the work, the more 
ordinary is the ordinary-observer standard, and the less original, the 
more discerning is the standard. Highly “complex” or “fanciful” 
works fall into the former category, whereas “simplistic” ones are 
usually approached under the latter.100 
This variation of protection has also resulted, in its extreme 
form, in what is today known as the “thin copyright” doctrine.101 
When the plaintiff’s work in question is highly unoriginal, uncreative, 
or made up primarily of unprotectible material, courts adopt an even 
more stringent approach to substantial similarity, occasionally 
referred to as “super-substantial similarity.”102 Here, the copying is 
thought to be problematic only when the works in question are 
“virtually identical” and the duplication of protectible materials is 
shown to have happened in its entirety.103 Compilations are a common 
 
 98. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.1[B] (“In the more discerning 
ordinary observer test, the fact finder attempts to extract the unprotectible elements from 
consideration and determine whether the protectible elements as a whole are substantially 
similar . . . . The fact finder should not dissect the works and then compare only individual 
elements. The fact finder still must consider the works’ overall look and feel.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (“As a work embodies more in the way of particularized expression, it . . . receives 
broader copyright protection. . . . [T]he ‘strongest’ works . . . are almost entirely products of the 
author’s creativity . . . .”), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985); 
Pampered Chef Ltd. v. Magic Kitchen, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 785, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“[D]ifferent 
types of materials may be subject to varying degrees of copyright protection. Materials that are 
primarily fanciful, complex, artistic, novel and original are generally the most strongly protected 
by copyrights . . . .”).  
 100. Atari, 672 F.2d at 617. 
 101. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 915 (9th Cir. 2010); 
MyWebGrocer LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 2004); Tufenkian 
Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2003); Ets-Hokin 
v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When we apply the limiting doctrines, 
subtracting the unoriginal elements, Ets-Hokin is left with only a ‘thin’ copyright, which protects 
against only virtually identical copying.”). 
 102. See TransWestern Publ’g Co. LP v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773, 776 
(10th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Brennan, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1258 (D.N.M. 2009). 
 103. Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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category of works to which this approach is routinely employed, so as 
to ensure that protection is limited to the “selection and 
arrangement” of the expression and not to the expression itself.104 
Despite the variation in standard of scrutiny, courts continue to 
adopt a holistic comparison of the works in terms of their overall 
similarity. The variation comes about instead in the level of 
discernment that a fact finder employs during such assessment—
greater attention to detail, purpose, and context while nonetheless 
comparing the works in their entirety. The Second Circuit’s 
observation in this regard is instructive: 
  In applying [the more discerning ordinary observer] test, a court 
is not to dissect the works at issue into separate components and 
compare only the copyrightable elements. To do so would be to take 
the “more discerning” test to an extreme, which would result in 
almost nothing being copyrightable because original works broken 
down into their composite parts would usually be little more than 
basic unprotectible elements like letters, colors and 
symbols . . . . [W]e have nevertheless always recognized that the test 
is guided by comparing the “total concept and feel” of the contested 
works.105 
If the test of similarity remains the same but the person whose 
eyes through which it is examined is to be considered more discerning, 
it must imply that the person’s points of emphasis for assessing such 
similarity begin to change. The process is therefore far from being a 
mechanistic elimination of unprotectible elements and a comparison 
of what remains thereafter. Even after recognizing elements to be 
unprotectible, the court is still to compare the two works as a whole, 
while underemphasizing the unprotectible parts in contrast to the 
protectible parts, and analyzing their relative contributions to the 
works in question.106 This contrast is particularly true when it comes to 
 
 104. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 105. Boisson v. Banian Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 106. Robert Osterberg and Eric Osterberg provide a good example using a hypothetical 
involving two blues songs. In conducting the analysis, they note that the court 
must remember that the songs are both blues songs. They share certain characteristics 
with all blues songs, such as use of a twelvebar phrase. The fact finder must not 
consider similarities common to all blues songs to determine whether the works are 
substantially similar. Rather, the fact finder must apply the more discerning ordinary 
observer test to decide whether, apart from the fact that the two songs are both blues 
songs, the songs sound alike. 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.1.  
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works for which the protectible and unprotectible content is only 
separable conceptually, such as in compilations or works with a 
utilitarian element. 
What this analysis reveals is that in reality there is an 
intermediate step between the stages of dissection and similarity, one 
with deep normative significance. Following the dissection or 
extrinsic phase, the court doesn’t just jump into the inquiry of 
whether the copying was wrongful. It pauses to set the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to be applied during the assessment of similarity. It 
determines here how thick the entitlement is to be, with thickness 
bearing an inverse correlation to the level of scrutiny to be employed 
in the second stage. This determination of thickness, however, is not 
arbitrary or uninformed. It draws entirely from the court’s findings 
during the dissection exercise—during which it decides how deserving 
the work is of copyright protection, using copyright’s purposes and 
goals, as well as the formal devices that instantiate them.107 
Courts, of course, rarely acknowledge the thickness 
determination to be an intermediate step in the copying inquiry. Yet 
its structure makes it precisely that. A recent opinion of the Ninth 
Circuit applying the thinnest protection to a work comes closest to 
recognizing this. In discussing the substantial-similarity analysis, the 
court observed: 
Having dissected the alleged similarities and considered the range of 
possible expression, the court must define the scope of the plaintiff’s 
copyright—that is, decide whether the work is entitled to “broad” or 
“thin” protection. Depending on the degree of protection, the court 
must set the appropriate standard for a subjective comparison of the 
works to determine whether, as a whole, they are sufficiently similar 
to support a finding of illicit copying.108 
The court here thus seems to acknowledge that following the 
dissection exercise it needs to set the appropriate level of scrutiny 
before proceeding to the wrongfulness determination. In actuality the 
analysis of copying thus involves multiple steps, with thickness 
forming an intermediate step between probative similarity and 
substantial similarity (Figure 1). Because the thickness determination 
informs the substantiality of the similarity analysis and is intimately 
 
 107. For an excellent example of how courts work this analysis, see Boisson, 273 F.2d at 
273–76. 
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the comparison be of the “total concept and feel”115 or the “overall 
look and feel”116 of the works rather than of individual components 
and dissimilarities. In applying this general standard, they tend to 
focus on both qualitative and quantitative elements.117 
The quantitative element involves assessing how much of the 
protected work the defendant copied, a relatively straightforward 
inquiry.118 In using this quantitative variable, courts sometimes 
examine whether a de minimis threshold for copying has been crossed 
and no more.119 The qualitative element, on the other hand, examines 
the value and significance of the copied material to the plaintiff’s (as 
opposed to the defendant’s) work.120 Here the question is always 
whether the defendant took something from the plaintiff’s work that 
was worthy of protection against the defendant’s copying. The 
qualitative threshold introduces an important temporal dimension to 
the analysis, insofar as the decision maker is asked to focus on the 
value of the elements taken by the defendant’s copying to the 
plaintiff’s work as manifested in the work, and no more. Thus if a 
portrait of a person, an artistic work, has material in the background 
that is largely incidental to the original work and which is copied by a 
defendant and assumes prominence later on, the qualitative threshold 
allows the court to conclude that the copied material was not of value 
to the first work. This determination is based entirely on the court’s 
analysis of the plaintiff’s work and consequently on the point in time 
that it was created.121 
 
 115. E.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 
1982), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985). 
 116. E.g., Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 117. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Substantiality is 
measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied portion in 
relation to the plaintiff’s work as a whole.”); Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d 
1366, 1376–77 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering the “[a]mount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”). 
 118. See Nihon, 166 F.3d at 71 (finding that the infringer “use[d] about two-thirds of the 
protectible material”). 
 119. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2:4. 
 120. Id. But see Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The material taken is 
not qualitatively important to either [the original or copied work].”). 
 121. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2:4 (justifying the rule as “permit[ting] 
authors to build on existing works by focusing on details that earlier authors may have glossed 
over or otherwise treated in a more cursory fashion”). 
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To be sure, the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the 
analysis often intersect and influence each other.122 The key point to 
remember for our purposes, though, is that the similarity assessment 
at this stage operates as a proxy for the wrongfulness of the 
defendant’s actions. The comparison of similarity therefore is largely 
to determine whether the defendant’s copying, when viewed as a 
whole, meets the decision maker’s intuitive sense of wrongfulness, 
calibrated by the appropriate standard of scrutiny. This accounts for 
why courts sometimes describe the similarity assessment as “virtually 
devoid of analysis.”123 Though this does not imply that the assessment 
is devoid of an analytical framework altogether, it does emphasize 
that it remains a subjective value judgment that is guided by reason. 
When courts alter the thickness of the entitlement using various 
criteria, the parameters of the comparison in the wrongfulness 
analysis begin to change, too. While the comparison must still remain 
of the overall work, and entail both quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions, the points of emphasis begin to change.124 Instead of a 
casual overall observation of the work, the court now weighs the 
protectible parts of the work more heavily than the others, and the 
most valuable parts of the work are given the heaviest weight. It thus 
entails an examination which—while not entailing the artificial 
elimination of unprotectible works—begins to accord different parts 
of the work differential emphasis in light of the level of discernment 
required by the appropriate standard.125 The alteration that occurs 
thus involves ensuring that the data points for the comparison are 
weighted appropriately to simulate an observer with heightened 
knowledge of the works in question and their market.126 
One way that courts operationalize this variation is by explicitly 
altering the characteristics and traits of the discerning observer in 
 
 122. Nihon, 166 F.3d at 71 (“It is not possible to determine infringement through a simple 
word count; the quantitative analysis of two works must always occur in the shadow of their 
qualitative nature.”). 
 123. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that the test has 
become “virtually devoid of analysis” because it “has become a mere subjective judgment as to 
whether two literary works are or are not similar”). 
 124. See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 273 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 125. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[F][5] (emphasizing the nonmechanical 
and subjective nature of the evaluation, even after the unprotectible parts have been 
eliminated).  
 126. See Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 135 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (noting that the test cannot be applied through the eyes of “the judicial observer who 
has a passing familiarity with [the market]”). 
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light of the nature of the works in question. In a case involving the 
infringement of a board game with original and unoriginal features, 
for instance, the Ninth Circuit applied the standard of a “discerning 
17.5 year old boy” to find that an ordinary observer was unlikely to 
find the two works to be similar based on the elements that such an 
observer was likely to emphasize during the comparison.127 In another 
case involving a video game with large amounts of unprotectible 
material, the Seventh Circuit similarly concluded that a discerning 
observer in this market was likely to pay much more attention to the 
functional features of the game rather than to the artistic expression, 
or to the aesthetic appeal that it has.128 One court likened the 
“reasonably discerning consumer” to one who would spend thousands 
of dollars on the products in question to conclude that such an 
ordinary observer was unlikely to be deceived as to the origin of the 
works.129 This process closely mirrors the way in which courts have 
long been known to alter the reasonable person standard in 
negligence cases, depending on the nature and type of harm 
involved.130 The reasonable person may thus be a professional well 
versed in a particular discipline in instances of professional 
negligence, and in other instances a mere prudent man.131 Few would 
deny, though, that in varying the reasonable person in negligence 
cases, courts are doing anything but altering their very assessment of 
the wrongfulness of the defendant’s actions by introducing or 
eliminating variables that the fictional person might have 
considered.132 The same process is at play here. 
 
 127. Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209–10 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 128. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(“Video games, unlike an artist’s painting or even other audiovisual works, appeal to an 
audience that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their concern about more subtle differences in 
artistic expression.”), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985). 
 129. Odegard Inc. v. Safavieh Carpets, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 275, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 130. See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 324 
(2012). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010) (discussing the factors to be 
considered in determining whether a defendant exercised “reasonable” care under the 
circumstances in question).  
 131. See, e.g., Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529 (N.C. 1979) (“Indeed, our 
courts have long recognized that one who engages in a business, occupation, or profession must 
exercise the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability of that calling with reasonable and 
ordinary care.”). 
 132. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1747 (1976); Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. 
REV. 317, 317–18 (1914) (“The ‘ordinary prudent man’ is a palpable fiction . . . . What this 
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D. The Flexibility of Substantial Similarity 
In functional terms the substantial-similarity analysis involves 
two distinct stages: a court’s selection of a standard of wrongfulness 
or similarity for the analysis—the thickness determination—and its 
eventual application of that standard to its comparison of the two 
works—the similarity analysis. Putting the two prongs of the 
substantial-similarity analysis back together reveals that courts use it 
as a distinct dimension of the copyright entitlement under which 
different works are accorded different amounts of protection on an 
individualized basis. The variation in protection is best represented by 





















Overall similarity but 
with differences 
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Thin “Near identity” 
Overall similarity with 
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conceptually 
inseparable source of 
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Copyright law treats a variety of different works in a largely 
identical manner. This treatment is in turn known to produce what 
some scholars refer to as “uniformity costs.”133 Although scholars 
have lamented copyright’s lack of adequate tailoring to combat these 
costs,134 few have focused on the reality that courts have long been 
attempting to achieve precisely this result under the substantial-
similarity analysis.135 To be sure, the process is far more subtle and 
nuanced than an explicit approach to subject-matter-based tailoring—
that is, according different types of works different rights—and is 
 
imaginary person would have done really means what the jury thinks was the proper thing to 
do . . . .”). 
 133. See Carroll, supra note 22, at 85667, 87578. 
 134. Id. at 85667. 
 135. But see id. at 899. 
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often cloaked in the rhetoric of the similarity analysis. Yet on closer 
analysis, it reveals how courts have been using copyright’s structure as 
a wrong-based approach to creative inducement to achieve such 
tailoring. 
Instead of introducing new a priori filters based either on subject 
matter or the institution’s purposes—which might be seen as an 
incursion into Congress’s domain, considering that these elements 
have historically been determined legislatively136—courts instead 
modulate the scope of protection during their analysis of 
infringement. Copyright’s extensive emphasis on copying—both as a 
factual and normative matter—allows courts to achieve this 
modulation rather effectively. In practice, then, copyright’s 
entitlement structure is much more pliable than it comes across in 
theory, revealing how a unidimensional focus on legislative activity in 
the area often understates the importance of federal common-law 
rules that play an equally important role in the system’s operation.137 
None of this is to suggest that courts have developed a unified, 
coherent framework for the substantial-similarity analysis. Although 
few courts have explicitly acknowledged their use of the framework 
as a mechanism of entitlement modulation or as a policy lever, they 
nonetheless have in the last two decades begun to incrementally 
expand the substantive content of the analysis and explicate more on 
what goes into it.138 The time is thus ripe for a more comprehensive 
account of what the substantial-similarity analysis can and ought to be 
used for, given how far courts have come with it and their general 
willingness to make effective use of the flexibility and leeway 
accorded to them in the analysis. 
The analysis of copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement 
also reveals that in reality it involves two interrelated normative 
 
 136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  
 137. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 52 (2010) 
(focusing on copyright reform through statutory changes). 
 138. The Seventh Circuit is perhaps the most explicit about this. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. 
Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 61617 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]hat a work is 
copyrighted says very little about the scope of its protection.”), superseded on other grounds by 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985); see also Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States., 66 Fed. Cl. 8, 1718 
(2005) (describing the incremental expansion of the idea of “thin” copyright protection); 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, at § 3:1.5 (“[C]ourts in the Seventh Circuit make a 
distinction between probative similarity, similarity that proves copying, and substantial 
similarity, similarity that proves unlawful appropriation.”).  
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judgments during the infringement process. The first, which we may 
usefully call the purposive evaluation and which is seen during the 
thickness determination, involves an objective assessment of the work 
being accorded protection to measure the extent to which it furthers 
copyright’s fundamental purposes.139 Put simply, it entails fixing the 
thickness of the copyright holder’s exclusive entitlement in the work, 
disregarding the defendant’s work. Though the court is no doubt 
presented with evidence of copying here, this evaluation and the 
court’s determination of thickness must conceptually at least take 
place independent of the defendant’s actions. For instance, 
determining the ratio of protectible to unprotectible material in a 
work hardly necessitates examining the defendant’s work and can be 
gleaned entirely from the plaintiff’s work, perhaps with the aid of 
external evidence such as expert testimony. 
The second normative decision originates in the similarity 
analysis and involves a subjective evaluation of wrongdoing. Here, the 
fact finder is asked to apply the chosen standard of thickness to a 
comparison of the two works in order to determine whether there was 
any actionable wrongdoing in the defendant’s act of copying.140 
Whereas the first stage was conceptually objective, this stage is 
entirely relative because a comparison of the works is the essence of 
the process. While the purposive evaluation fixes the appropriate 
standard of scrutiny, it importantly does not tell the fact finder 
precisely what goes into that standard except in very general terms. 
The fact finder is thus directed to consciously alter the standard of 
scrutiny by paying close attention to certain elements of the work and 
by applying a suitably altered perspective. 
Each of these normative judgments involves a different 
structural framework which is crucial to appreciate—for it is only 
through this difference that copyright law is able to affirm multiple, 
often conflicting normative values in its adjudication process. Each 
stage of normative analysis also communicates a different guidance 
directive to actors—the first stage communicates an objective one, 
while the second stage signals a relational one141—and has a hitherto 
underappreciated effect on copyright’s upstream- and downstream-
 
 139. See supra Part I.B. 
 140. See supra Part I.C. 
 141. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
917, 94547 (2010).  
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incentive structure.142 This latter set of issues is fully explored in the 
next Part. 
II.  SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY AND INCOMMENSURABILITY 
Having examined how the substantial-similarity inquiry works 
and the underappreciated flexibility that it affords courts in tailoring 
copyright’s entitlement structure on an individualized basis, this Part 
moves from the positive to the normative. It argues that the two-
pronged process of the substantial-similarity analysis can be 
reconstructed as a mechanism of conceptually ordering the 
introduction and instantiation of plural values into the copyright 
analysis. The flexibility examined in the previous Part, in other words, 
can be understood as possessing an important substantive dimension, 
in addition to a structural one. 
Part II.A begins by setting out the problems inherent in 
multicriterion-based decision making, long known in the world of 
social-choice theory, to show how copyright adjudication as a branch 
of legal decision making harbors the same problems. Part II.B then 
introduces the idea of the conceptually sequenced argument as a 
partial solution to the problem of incommensurable values, drawing 
on other areas of the common law in which it is employed as a 
reasoned accommodation of plural values. Part II.C then moves back 
to the world of copyright law to reconstruct substantial similarity and 
its two-staged normative analysis as a sequenced ordering of different 
kinds of values during the infringement inquiry. In the first step, 
copyright’s principally utilitarian values find their place and are given 
direct salience by the thickness inquiry, while in the second, 
copyright’s relational values, many of which are deontic or rights-
based in structure, find instantiation during the analysis of similarity. 
A. Copyright Adjudication as a Form of Multicriterial Decision 
Making 
Central to social-choice theory is the idea of majority-voting 
paradoxes, under which an attempt to aggregate the preferences of 
individual voters, in order to reach a majority decision, produces an 
 
 142. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Response, Tiered Originality and the Dualism of 
Copyright Incentives, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 67, 69 (2009), http://www.virginialawreview.org/ 
inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2009/11/30/balganesh. 
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intransitivity.143 Thus, if there are three candidates to choose from 
(John, Henry, and Bill) and three voters whose preferences are to be 
aggregated (A, B, and C) the following ordering of their preferences 















As we see, a majority of voters (A, C) prefer John to Henry, and 
a majority (A, B) also prefers Henry to Bill. The logic of transitivity 
would suggest that a majority would also prefer John to Bill. Yet, as it 
turns out, a majority (B, C) actually prefers Bill to John—producing 
an intransitivity. The very same logic carries over to decision making 
that isn’t simply trying to aggregate the preferences of multiple 
individuals, but is instead trying to aggregate preferences based on 
multiple independent criteria. Consider the following alternative 
hypothetical, which reveals the symmetry: You are deciding on a new 
car to buy, and you narrow your choice down to three: a Honda, a 
Ferrari, and a Ford, and you are now trying to choose among the 
three using three independent—and equally important—criteria:145 
















Again, the same intransitivity manifests itself. The Ford beats the 
Honda on price and speed, while the Honda beats the Ferrari on 
price and reliability, but the Ferrari beats the Ford on both speed and 
 
 143. Bruce Chapman, More Easily Done Than Said: Rules, Reasons, and Rational Social 
Choice, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 29697 (1998). 
 144. See ARROW, supra note 33. 
 145. This is an important axiom. In the event that the criteria themselves can be weighted 
differently—which would be the equivalent of treating different voters differently in the 
election—the problem dissipates in large measure. 
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reliability. Assuming that each criterion is equally important, there is 
no way of combining the preferences to yield a single choice. The 
intransitivity seen in the two examples above would continue to exist 
even if we were to reduce the number of criteria or voters to two. It 
would then turn into the following preference orderings—which 











 Once again, it becomes impossible to aggregate the preferences 
into a single decision, though it becomes possible to eliminate a 
choice in each instance if we are looking for a winner: Bill in the 
voting, and the Ferrari in the choice of car. Yet among the other two 
choices, no obvious winner emerges. 
Legal decision making in innumerable contexts exhibits these 
very features of multicriterion decision making. By introducing 
additional criteria into the picture, it alters the law’s ordering of 
preferences and outcomes.146 Professor Leo Katz has persuasively 
shown how this produces legal “loopholes” which are incapable of 
being plugged and therefore form the bread and butter of 
lawyering.147 The introduction of new criteria and alternatives thus 
alters the original ordering of relative preferences. 
What is additionally important to forms of legal decision making 
is that the setting is invariably relational. In other words, because a 
court is often confronted with a binary choice between plaintiff and 
defendant, sometimes criteria that are entirely a product of that 
binary setup enter the picture to alter the original preference 
ordering. In some very illuminating work on social-choice theory, 
Professor Bruce Chapman has shown that this is precisely how the 
intransitivity of preferences affects legal decision making.148 In a 
hypothetical he shows how an individual’s urge to maximize pleasure 
 
 146. See KATZ, supra note 34, at 6–7.  
 147. See Leo Katz, A Theory of Loopholes, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (2010) (“[L]oophole 
exploitation and skillful persuasion turn out to differ only by a hair, and inasmuch as we never 
felt too uneasy about the latter, we have one more reason not to feel too uneasy about the 
former.”). 
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might cause him or her to choose a medium-sized orange over a small 
apple, and a big apple over the medium-sized orange.149 Yet, when 
presented with the option of a small and a big apple, the individual 
chooses the small apple out of a new consideration—etiquette—that 
seems to enter the picture only in a choice between different sizes of 
the same fruit.150 These preferences now produce the same 
intransitivity as before: the big apple is preferred to the orange, the 
orange to the small apple but surprisingly, the small apple to the big 
apple.151 
What we thus see happening in situations in which the decision is 
framed in binary, relational terms is that values that are best realized 
in their maximization lose their dominance to other values that are 
relative or comparative in nature.152 In Professor Chapman’s 
hypothetical, the hedonistic ideal of maximizing one’s pleasure 
through the largest possible fruit doesn’t disappear in the final choice 
between apples; rather, it is overridden by etiquette, which becomes 
more salient, and therefore “dominant,” when the frame is 
comparative.153 This is precisely what happens in the context of legal 
adjudication: even when the law purports to maximize welfare, 
interpersonal considerations such as fairness and justice come into the 
picture.154 In choosing between the plaintiff and the defendant, courts 
simply do not focus exclusively on the result that is likely to maximize 
overall welfare while ignoring comparative considerations between 
the parties to the dispute.155 
The same considerations enter the picture in copyright law. 
Copyright’s principal justification is utilitarian. According to this 
ideal, which is largely accepted by courts, scholars, and legislators, 
copyright’s primary purpose remains the inducement of creativity.156 
By providing creators with limited exclusivity over their creative 
 
 149. Id. at 1498. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 149899. 
 152. Id. at 150102. 
 153. Id. at 1502. 
 154. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 
54043 (1972). 
 155. But see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52–62 
(2002).  
 156. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1569, 1577 (2009).  
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works, copyright is thought to induce the creation of those works.157 
The economic analysis of copyright law, which builds on this basic 
utilitarian framework, further posits that the system attempts to 
provide creators with the most socially efficient incentive mechanism, 
represented in the incentives-access tradeoff.158 This general 
utilitarian ideal is also thought to derive from the Constitution’s 
mandate that copyright law “promote the Progress” of the sciences 
and the useful arts through a system of exclusive rights—a 
proposition that the Supreme Court has come to affirm time after 
time.159 Maximizing social welfare, or overall utility, thus lies at the 
heart of what copyright as an institution is trying to achieve. At the 
same time though, copyright adjudication—much like all other forms 
of adjudication—is bilateral in structure and substance. In 
adjudicating a claim for infringement, the court must invariably 
choose between the plaintiff and the defendant. Inter-subjective or 
comparative considerations thus invariably enter the picture, and 
much like in other contexts, offset the ordering of preferences based 











 157. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).  
 158. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 613 (1962). 
 159. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) 
(“Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science . . . .”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (“The ‘constitutional command,’ we have recognized, is that Congress, to 
the extent it enacts copyright laws at all, create a ‘system’ that ‘promote[s] the Progress of 
Science.’” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1965)) (alteration 
in original)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The 
rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a 
fair return for their labors.”).  
 160. The precise ranking of thick and thin protection becomes irrelevant in the binary 
choice between the plaintiff and the defendant, because either way “protection” involves 
finding for the plaintiff-creator, which the court chooses not to. 
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Going back to our hypothetical involving da Vinci and Dalí,161 
then, on purely utilitarian considerations—and based exclusively on 
an analysis of da Vinci’s work and creativity—a judge would be 
inclined to favor da Vinci. But when the choice is narrowed down to 
Dalí and da Vinci, such that the wrongfulness of Dalí’s actions 
becomes salient, the choice might reverse itself because comparative 
considerations are capable of overriding the ideal of utility 
maximization in the abstract. Following from the discussion in the 
previous Part,162 a judge might thus—based on an assessment 
exclusively of da Vinci’s work—favor thick protection over no 
protection and thin protection over no protection. We might logically 
assume that the ordering of preferences is as follows: thick protection 
is preferred to thin protection which is preferred to no protection. Yet 
when Dalí’s copying enters the picture and the court considers Dalí’s 
actions—to realize that his copying is insubstantial and of parts that 
do not manifest da Vinci’s personality interest in the work—the court 
is likely to now choose no protection over either thick or thin 
protection. Much like in other areas of multicriterial decision making, 
we have a problem of aggregating values. 
B.  Conceptual Sequencing as a Partial Solution 
In trying to find a solution to the paradoxes of majority-voting 
preferences and multicriterial decision making, Arrow eventually 
concluded that a coherent, rational aggregation was indeed 
impossible.163 This was the gist of his “impossibility theorem,” as it 
came to be known164—and to date, no one has shown it to be wholly 
wrong. Probing a little deeper into Arrow’s framework, however, 
reveals that his primary concern with the paradox of intransitive 
preferences had to do with its likely consequences on decision 
processes. As Chapman points out, Arrow was concerned that the 
“collectively irrational social choice would show itself as a kind of 
arbitrary dependence of the final social choice on the choice path.”165 
The concern was thus that the intransitivity would result in a choice 
 
 161. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra Part I.C.  
 163. See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 
328, 342 (1950). 
 164. The formal proof was titled the “General Possibility Theorem.” In due course, it came 
to acquire the name it currently holds. Amartya Sen, Social Choice and Justice: A Review 
Article, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 1764, 1765 (1984). 
 165. Chapman, supra note 143, at 297. 
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that followed a form of path dependence, which was arbitrarily or 
strategically chosen.166 This enabled an adept agenda setter to produce 
whatever result she wants by determining the decision path to be 
applied. Arrow’s concern was thus less with path dependence per se 
and more with an arbitrarily or strategically chosen one.167 What this 
tells us is that if the path dependence is chosen neither arbitrarily nor 
strategically—but based on a reasoned priority—a large part of the 
concern motivating the problem of social choice begins to disappear. 
Legal adjudication, in contrast to numerous other forms of 
decision making, takes processes, institutions, and values very 
seriously. Rules and precedents preserve a form of path dependence 
of their own, and that produces a discernible level of consistency 
across time and context. Consequently, a partial solution to the 
problem of incoherence in multicriterial decision making lies in 
replacing the possibility of an arbitrary or strategic path dependence 
with a reason-based one.168 This is the idea behind the process of 
conceptual sequencing, under which different criteria are allowed to 
enter the decision-making process sequentially, in recognition of their 
relative importance to the decision process under consideration, 
thereby giving them each sequential play in the final decision.169 The 
most prominent modern reconstruction of the idea of defeasible rules 
as a mechanism of conceptual sequencing is found in the work of 
Professor Chapman, who has sought to apply it to explain the 
workings of tort and criminal law.170 
In a series of insightful papers, Chapman shows how tort law can 
be seen as accommodating both rights-based arguments—that is, 
corrective justice—and welfare-driven arguments, within its 
 
 166. Id. at 29697; Bruce Chapman, Law Games: Defeasible Rules and Revisable Rationality, 
17 LAW & PHIL. 443, 453 n.23 (1998). Professor Chapman describes this as a “structure-induced 
equilibrium.” Chapman, supra note 143, at 295. 
 167. Chapman, supra note 143, at 303; see also Arrow, supra note 163, at 330 (“For any 
method of deriving social choices by aggregating individual preference patterns which satisfies 
certain natural conditions, it is possible to find individual preference patters which give rise to a 
social choice pattern which is not a linear ordering.”).  
 168. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1496 (“[T]here are . . . grounds for thinking that . . . the 
theory of rational choice and value maximization provides only a very partial or incomplete 
understanding of rationality as reason-based choice.”).  
 169. Id. at 1508. 
 170. See, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Pluralism in Tort and Accident Law: Towards a Reasonable 
Accommodation, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 276, 30812 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 
2001); Chapman, supra note 166, at 446; Chapman, supra note 40, at 1509.  
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framework.171 Beginning with the recognition that ordinarily tort law 
prioritizes the right over the good in its corrective-justice structure, 
Chapman illustrates how it nonetheless carves out room for welfare-
based considerations at the peripheries of its framework.172 One 
prominent example is the concept of “unreasonable risk,” a concept 
which courts unpack using a two-staged analysis.173 In the first stage 
they examine the reasonable foreseeability of the risk, applying a 
reasonable-person standard. In the second stage they ask what the 
reasonable person would do when faced with this risk. Yet, when the 
risk is found to be small or insubstantial Chapman notes that courts 
introduce a third stage of analysis, which involves assessing the cost to 
the defendant of eliminating the risk in question—an inquiry into the 
“burden of precautions.”174 Until this last step, the analysis 
consciously avoids introducing utilitarian variables into the decision 
making, and when it does it succeeds in ordering those variables 
sequentially after other considerations such that they are rendered 
incapable of directly conflicting with rights-based considerations. In 
conceptual sequencing, the law thus partitions the inquiry into stages 
such that each stage limits the criteria that a decision maker uses in 
choosing between options.175 The path dependence is thus a form of 
“partition dependence”—with the sequence of partitions chosen on 
the basis of reasons relating to the institution in question.176 
Chapman argues that the same sequential pattern can be 
detected in Professor Richard Epstein’s well-known account of 
nuisance law as an institution structured around “corrective justice” 
with “utilitarian constraints.”177 In his account, Epstein draws a 
distinction between the elements of a prima facie case of nuisance—
which involves the invasion of a legally protected interest—and the 
defendant’s ability to thereafter introduce an additional set of 
considerations, all of which seem to derive from utilitarian concerns 
independent of the defendant’s invasion.178 Chapman rightly claims 
 
 171. See Chapman, supra note 170; Chapman, supra note 40, at 150714.  
 172. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1509–14, 1521–26; see also Chapman, supra note 143, at 
31012. 
 173. Chapman, supra note 40, at 152126. 
 174. Id. at 1525. 
 175. Id. at 152425. 
 176. Chapman, supra note 143, at 305. 
 177. Chapman, supra note 40, at 151114; see also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: 
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50 (1979). 
 178. Epstein, supra note 177, at 4950; see also Chapman, supra note 40, at 1511.  
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that Epstein’s account is best understood as a conceptually sequenced 
argument that attempts to sequence the introduction of rights-based 
and welfarist values into the nuisance decision-making process.179 
Chapman also ascribes a similar structure to Professor George 
Fletcher’s account of excuses in criminal law.180 
Central to conceptual sequencing as a mechanism of 
accommodating plural values is the requirement that the sequencing 
have a reason for its conceptual ordering.181 In other words, there 
must be a basis for the law’s choice of a particular sequence in which 
to introduce variables and values into the decision making, for 
without such a reason the demarcation may be considered arbitrarily 
path dependent, or as doing no more than eliding the problem of 
value incommensurability.182 Sequencing, in other words, must 
originate in a prioritization of values that is internal to the system. 
For tort law, this ordering is thought to derive from the priority of 
corrective justice over utilitarian goals, and in criminal law from the 
priority of wrongdoing and human agency over other variables.183 In 
this way, conceptual sequencing allows tort law to accommodate both 
corrective justice and deterrence and allows criminal law to do the 
same with compassion, retribution, and deterrence. 
Another particularly good example of a conceptually sequenced 
explanation for tort law’s plural values comes from no less a believer 
in corrective justice theory than Professor Ernest Weinrib.184 While 
arguing that tort law—and indeed all of private law—is premised on 
the idea of corrective justice, he concedes that the process of 
conceptual sequencing can explain how the system of tort law in 
reality serves the purposes of deterrence.185 To him, the fact that the 
law’s practice of corrective justice is ensconced in positive law means 
it can perform additional functions of law “qua positive law,” 
including deterrence.186 Deterrence here is thus viewed as furthering 
 
 179. Chapman, supra note 40, at 1512. 
 180. Id. at 151520; see also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 949, 95457 (1985). 
 181. See Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and 
Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 6483 (1994). 
 182. Id. at 47. 
 183. Chapman, supra note 40, at 151920, 152425.  
 184. Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2002).  
 185. Id. at 63839. 
 186. Id. at 638. 
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corrective justice “while leaving it intact,” but entirely through the 
process of conceptual sequencing.187 
What is perhaps obvious from this discussion of conceptual 
sequencing is that the examples thus far all tend to unambiguously 
prioritize the right over the good—that is, rights-based arguments, 
such as corrective justice or retribution, over utilitarian ones, such as 
deterrence. In none of the examples Chapman uses to illustrate the 
concept does he identify an instance in which this ordering is 
reversed—even though he considers the theoretical possibility of it 
manifesting itself in multiple places.188 In other words, can there be a 
legal institution in which the decision-making process is sequenced so 
as to first allow for a prima facie entitlement that is utilitarian in 
structure, followed by a temporally subsequent introduction of 
nonutilitarian values into the process? The substantial-similarity 
analysis in copyright law, I argue, represents precisely such a 
sequenced formulation in copyright decision making. 
C.  Accommodating Plural Values in Copyright Law 
Despite the dominance of copyright’s utilitarian theory, most 
scholars tend to agree that other, distinctly nonutilitarian values play 
some role in the overall structural and functional dimensions of the 
institution.189 Of these, authors’ rights-based conceptions of the 
copyright entitlement are perhaps the most dominant, according to 
which copyright law serves a set of autonomy-related purposes 
internal to the author, and often independent of the institution’s 
overall utilitarian ideals.190 Yet, copyright law and scholarship have 
struggled to develop a coherent mechanism by which to achieve the 
 
 187. Id. at 639. 
 188. Chapman, supra note 40, at 151213; Chapman, supra note 166, at 454. 
 189. See, e.g., DAVID LANGE & JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 169 (2009); Keith Aoki, Distributive and 
Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and 
Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 720 (2006); Daniel Benoliel, Copyright Distributive 
Injustice, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 45, 72 (2007); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 361–64 (1996); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 257, 312 (2006); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1535, 153967 (2005); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor 
and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 52231 (1990).  
 190. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in 
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4860 (1994); 
Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A 
Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 398441 (1993) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright 
Alienability Restrictions].  
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reasonable accommodation of these nonutilitarian goals and values 
with the institution’s core utilitarian foundation.191 This failure has in 
turn resulted in copyright’s nonutilitarian ideals either receding into 
the backdrop and diminishing in significance or, alternatively, in their 
being reconceptualized in distinctly utilitarian terms in order to 
achieve their accommodation (through a direct tradeoff) with the 
institution’s widely accepted utilitarian tenets.192 
The two-staged process of substantial similarity, on the other 
hand, reveals an ideal mechanism by which to achieve just such an 
accommodation, given its conceptually sequenced structure. In so 
doing, it keeps the two sets of values separate and affirms them both, 
but in a sequenced order. Yet a major move that it makes is that it 
treats the nonutilitarian variable as a comparative inquiry rather than 
as a transcendent one that needs to be maximized in the abstract. In 
the process, the personality-based determination feeds into 
considerations of corrective justice that lie at the heart of copyright’s 
liability determination. The discussion below describes this in greater 
detail. 
1. Thickness as Copyright’s Utilitarian Inquiry.  Recall that the 
first part of the substantial-similarity inquiry involves the court 
determining the extent to which the plaintiff’s work in question serves 
copyright’s goals. Though it happens simultaneously with a dissection 
of the defendant’s work, the court here examines how meritorious the 
work is of copyright protection and accordingly fixes the standard of 
scrutiny to be applied in the second stage.193 This step is comparative 
only in a nominal sense, because the focus is in reality on the 
protected work: to examine what parts of it are unprotectible, and 
indeed how protectible it is as a whole. Somewhat counterintuitively, 
courts often examine the defendant’s work to compare it to the 
 
 191. Two previous strategies are worth mentioning. The first, is the “monist” theory of 
copyright, according to which copyright’s utilitarian (that is, economic) purposes are 
“subsumed” within the rights-based, or autonomy-driven purposes. Netanel, Copyright 
Alienability Restrictions, supra note 190, at 378. The second involves the argument that the idea 
of incentives—the gravamen of copyright’s utilitarian theory—can take color from noneconomic 
motivations as well, such as spiritual, religious, and personal ones. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, 
Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1945, 1975 (2006).  
 192. See, e.g., Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012).  
 193. See supra Part I.B. 
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plaintiff’s, but in principle the determination is confined to the 
plaintiff’s work.194 
What remains largely unappreciated is that in this first step 
courts effectively scrutinize the work in question against copyright’s 
systemic, utilitarian goal of inducing creative expression with minimal 
cost to society. According to this goal, which remains rooted in the 
basic premises of welfare economics, the institution of copyright 
promotes overall social welfare by limiting the ability of noncreators 
to copy a creative work, thereby inducing creators to produce such 
work to begin with. Copyright law’s internal devices are, under this 
theory, directed at ensuring the realization of this inducement, while 
minimizing the social costs that the inducement entails. Courts use 
the thickness determination to realize this objective. To be sure, they 
have thus far only ever used copyright’s formal devices as 
benchmarks for the comparison: the originality requirement, the idea-
expression distinction, the exclusion for useful elements of a work, 
and the assurance that compilations are accorded protection on the 
selection, coordination, and arrangement of underlying material. 
Each of these variables has over time come to be understood as doing 
no more than serving copyright’s utilitarian purpose. Ever since Feist, 
the originality requirement has unquestionably come to be 
understood as deriving from the Constitution’s utilitarian mandate for 
copyright law and the underlying costs associated with according 
protection to unoriginal or uncreative works.195 In a similar vein, the 
idea-expression dichotomy is treated by courts as a device by which to 
minimize copyright’s monopoly costs by balancing incentives and 
access.196 The same is equally true with the exclusion for useful works 
and the protection for compilations—with courts often explicitly 
reasoning that these formal devices do no more than prevent the 
plaintiff from obtaining a socially inefficient monopoly.197 Regardless 
of the context under which these concepts and devices originated, 
they are today understood in principally utilitarian terms. 
As a structural matter, too, thickness lends itself perfectly to 
being used as a vehicle by which to give effect to copyright’s 
 
 194. See supra Part I.B.  
 195. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).  
 196. See A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 71112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 4 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[B][2][a].  
 197. See Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Batlin v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976).  
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utilitarian ideals. Unlike other dimensions of the copyright 
entitlement, which tend to operate in largely binary terms, its 
structure as a continuum forces courts to directly engage the question 
of not just whether the work at issue furthers copyright’s purposes, 
but also how much it furthers those purposes. Thickness can thus be 
understood as a principally utilitarian inquiry, in which courts 
determine how much protection a work needs to obtain based on the 
extent to which it furthers copyright’s goal of inducing creative 
expression. Given the underlying utilitarian emphasis within the 
variables that courts consider at this stage, there seems to be little 
reason not to factor in additional variables that derive from the same 
set of utilitarian goals that have long been known to motivate 
copyright law. 
What is additionally interesting in understanding thickness as a 
mechanism by which to give effect to copyright’s utilitarian goals is 
how it also effectively converts copyright law’s existing binary 
utilitarian calculations into ones that can be understood as lying along 
a continuum. Originality, for instance, is often understood as a value 
that merits being operationalized only in binary terms. Either a work 
is original and therefore protectible, or it is not.198 So, too, with the 
merger doctrine: either the idea and expression in a work are merged, 
rendering the whole unprotectible, or they are not.199 Thickness allows 
courts to parse these categories out further, in the process identifying 
shades of originality—or the extent to which idea and expression have 
merged—without having to decide the issue in purely binary terms. 
Realizing copyright’s utilitarian objectives is most often a matter of 
degree, because in some abstract sense granting any work some 
protection can be seen as furthering copyright’s goal of inducing 
creativity. The question is invariably one of how much protection and 
at what cost, a question which requires a more granular and tailored 
approach—one that thickness allows courts to adopt. 
This brings us in turn to the task of determining what additional 
utilitarian values and variables might be capable of being given effect 
in this stage of the inquiry. The first thing to remember about the 
utilitarian calculus that this stage entails is that it operates in the 
 
 198. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 91, at 1506. My argument here, however, 
disagrees with their subsequent observation that “[c]opyright law fails to take the next step and 
calibrate the scope of the copyright protection to the degree of the work’s originality.” Id.; see 
also Balganesh, supra note 142, at 75–76.  
 199. See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 91 (2007). 
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individual rather than the aggregate. In other words, the cost-benefit 
calculus that the utilitarian analysis entails occurs at the level of the 
individual work being scrutinized by the court during the 
infringement inquiry. This in turn explains why courts are willing to 
conduct this inquiry through the lens of formal devices, such as 
originality, rather than directly, in the belief that these devices and 
the tests used to operationalize them derive from a prior aggregate 
analysis, which is then capable of being instantiated at the individual 
level.200 This maps onto the long-known distinction between act and 
rule utilitarianism.201 Whereas rule utilitarianism derives from a belief 
that a rule in question reflects an underlying utilitarian goal and that 
adherence to the rule will result in the realization of that goal, act 
utilitarianism derives from a belief that the utilitarian goal can only 
be realized through the measurement of the individual act directly 
against the goal sought to be realized. Rule utilitarianism thus derives 
from a generalization about the tendency of an act, ordinarily dealt 
with by the rule, to produce utilitarian consequences.202 In carrying 
out the thickness analysis, courts have thus far adhered in large 
measure to a rule-utilitarianism approach. 
All the same, there seems little reason to believe that courts are 
unlikely to move away from it when presented with methods of 
instantiating copyright’s utilitarian ideals directly, that is, in act-
utilitarianism terms. Indeed, a well-known objection to the 
sustainability of utilitarianism through rules is that in the end it 
collapses into a form of act utilitarianism.203 Circumstances will 
emerge over time in which noncompliance with a rule begins to 
produce more utility than compliance.204 The rule then begins to 
develop exceptions and subrules, and over time the key question in 
each instance becomes which subrule or exception applies and is to be 
followed, which in turn eventually results in the actor choosing the 
one that maximizes utility, an act-utilitarian inquiry.205 Consequently, 
having courts undertake the thickness inquiry by weighing copyright’s 
 
 200. See supra Part I.B. 
 201. The leading account of this distinction is by Professor David Lyons. See DAVID LYONS, 
FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 2–4 (1965). 
 202. Id. at 4.  
 203. See Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 9, 
2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule.  
 204. Id. 
 205. LYONS, supra note 201, at 11930. But see Boruch A. Brody, The Equivalence of Act 
and Rule Utilitarianism, 18 PHIL. STUD. 81, 8186 (1967).  
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utilitarian goals directly, rather than through formal rules, is not as far 
removed in practice as it might seem in principle. 
An additional variable that courts might be able to consider 
during the thickness analysis is the extent to which the work derives 
from a market-driven creative motivation, the central idea behind the 
utilitarian-inducement theory. In situations in which a work originates 
in motivations that involve a large noncommercial component, courts 
might alter the thickness of protection to reflect the reduced extent to 
which the work furthers copyright’s utilitarian goal of creative 
inducement. In recent work, Professor Lydia Loren has suggested 
that courts adopt an approach along these lines.206 Very interestingly, 
we see courts willing to undertake this examination on the 
defendant’s side as part of the fair-use analysis, in which they closely 
examine whether the defendant’s use of the protected work was for 
commercial or noncommercial purposes as one of the fair-use 
factors.207 An examination of commercial intent or motivation would 
thus do little more than transpose this to the plaintiff’s side of the 
inquiry as part of the thickness examination. 
Another set of variables to consider might be the peculiarities of 
the market in which the work operates and the need to promote 
competition in or entry into that market in order to lower the social 
costs of monopoly that are thought to accompany copyright 
protection. Professor Christopher Yoo has advocated a model of 
copyright law based on the economic theory of product 
differentiation, in which he argues that the spatial dimension of the 
relevant product market can be an appropriate mechanism for 
minimizing copyright’s deadweight losses, and he posits that the 
substantial-similarity analysis might be the right way of realizing that 
objective.208 Yoo’s model—deriving from copyright’s utilitarian 
ideals—would have to be operationalized through copyright’s 
thickness analysis. 
 
 206. See Loren, supra note 18, at 36 (arguing that courts should apply “thin” protection to 
works based on a comparison of their creative motivation). 
 207. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) (“In determining whether the use made of a work . . . is a 
fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature . . . .”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (finding use presumptively fair because it was of a 
noncommercial nature).  
 208. Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 
27172 (2004). 
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The more difficult value to address in this analysis is that of 
distributive justice. Distributive goals can of course be rendered 
compatible with utilitarianism.209 This compatibility is especially easy 
to achieve when the utilitarian calculus is an aggregate one rather 
than an individualized determination. In the aggregate formulation, 
distributive concerns can be internalized in the idea of social-welfare 
maximization.210 As an individualized determination between two 
parties, however, distributive justice becomes an ideal to be realized 
through interpersonal comparisons and less about incorporating 
distributive concerns into the utilitarian calculus.211 Discussions of 
distributive values in copyright law often fail to distinguish between 
the two.212 
Accepting thickness as copyright’s utilitarian calculus, however, 
requires making an important analytical move—namely, going 
beyond the focus on the work itself for the analysis. What 
characterizes the thickness inquiry in its current formulation, beyond 
its use of copyright’s formal devices, is its examination of copyright’s 
utilitarian values through the lens of the work and never 
independently.213 Expanding the gamut of utilitarian variables in the 
inquiry might seem to necessitate abandoning this approach. Mere 
analytic dissection, understood in its strict sense, might seem 
inadequate if the analysis is to go beyond the work itself. A closer 
examination of the ways in which courts approach the task of 
analyzing the work today reveals that the change suggested here is 
much less drastic than it might seem. 
In scrutinizing a work for its copyrightability under existing law, 
courts begin with a technique that is described as the “mute 
testimony” approach—focusing on the work itself for their analysis.214 
Although the court’s inquiry unquestionably commences with the 
work itself, the plaintiff is allowed to introduce additional evidence 
about the creative process—the judgments that went into the creation 
and the different motivations that were involved—to aid the court in 
 
 209. See Jeremy Waldron, Locating Distribution, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 28793 (2003). 
 210. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 155, at 2638 (“The choice of a method of 
aggregation involves the adoption of a view concerning matters of distribution.”). 
 211. See id. at 3738. 
 212. See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 189, at 153946. 
 213. See supra Part I.B. 
 214. See, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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its examination of the work.215 This evidence is then evaluated in 
relation to the work itself by the fact finder deciding the issue. Its use 
is most commonly seen when courts attempt to determine the 
conceptual separability of the aesthetic and useful parts of a work. 
The creator is allowed to introduce evidence of the design process 
and its connection to the nature of the work so that the court may 
understand the work in light of the creator’s actions.216 In practice, 
therefore, courts routinely look beyond the four corners of the work 
to analyze the work. The utilitarian value-based determination of 
copyright’s thickness should thus have little problem extending that 
technique here as well. 
2. Similarity as Copyright’s Correlative Inquiry.  Having set the 
thickness for their analysis, courts then move to analyzing the 
similarity between the two works, using the standard of scrutiny that 
they determine is warranted. The similarity analysis is, however, far 
from mechanical. It involves determining whether the defendant’s 
copying involved the appropriation of material of “value” and 
“substance” from the plaintiff’s work.217 It thus amounts to an 
assessment of legal actionability rather than a factual determination 
of mere boundary crossing of the kind seen in trespass cases.218 The 
leading treatise on substantial similarity makes this abundantly clear 
by illustrating the similarity analysis through the law of battery and 
noting how it forms the analog to battery’s determination of whether 
a defendant’s actions “rise to the level that is a compensable 
battery.”219 The similarity analysis thus involves more than just a 
reasonless comparison of de facto similarity between the two works 
and is structurally imbued with a subjective, normative assessment of 
whether the similarity is worthy of liability. 
Another way of understanding the similarity analysis is as an 
inquiry into the right-duty relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. Although it no doubt involves according a work 
protection, it does so not in the abstract but only through the 
 
 215. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145–46 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 216. Id. 
 217. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 1:1. 
 218. See Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63 (2009) (“[T]respass makes any volitional boundary crossing 
unlawful.”). 
 219. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 1:1. 
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mechanism of liability. This in turn means that its emphasis is on 
examining whether the defendant’s actions amount to an actionable 
interference with the plaintiff’s protected interest. It is thus structured 
in terms of right and duty, a relationship referred to by tort law 
theorists as the relationship of correlativity.220 
The idea of correlativity posits that the plaintiff and the 
defendant in any liability calculus are connected as “doer” and 
“sufferer” of the same injustice, which the liability judgment seeks to 
correct.221 The plaintiff’s entitlement is thought to make sense only 
when understood in terms of the defendant’s actions and not in the 
abstract. As Weinrib points out, “[e]ach party’s position is 
normatively significant only through the position of the other,”222 and 
never independent of it in a correlative set up. Correlativity is thought 
to originate in Aristotle’s idea of corrective justice, represented in 
turn in the bipolar relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant in a private-law action.223 Corrective justice is also different 
from distributive justice, which involves sharing the burdens of an 
action according to some distributive criterion, be it fairness or 
something else.224 The similarity analysis in copyright law gives effect 
to precisely this idea of corrective justice. 
In asking whether the defendant’s actions were enough to merit 
being classified as wrongful and rendered the basis for liability, the 
law is in effect requiring the decision maker to undertake an 
interpersonal analysis of the parties’ relative positions as manifested 
through their works. It is thus emphasizing a scrutiny of the 
defendant’s copying relative to the protection that the plaintiff’s right 
merits. The abstract basis of this protection is adjudicated in the first 
instance, but its relative basis is given effect during the comparison. 
Going back to the battery analogy, no one would deny that a plaintiff 
has the right to bodily integrity in the abstract, and yet the liability 
 
 220. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 114–15 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 107, 116–17 (2001). 
 221. Weinrib, supra note 220, at 110. 
 222. Id. 
 223. WEINRIB, supra note 220, at 56; see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, at 
120–21 (Martin Ostwald trans., Liberal Arts Press 22d prtg. 1984) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 224. See Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, 
in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 237 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000); see also Gregory C. 
Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 
194–95 (2000); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort 
as Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2006). 
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analysis involves determining whether the defendant’s touching is 
sufficient enough to be deemed an invasion of that abstract right, 
understood in relational terms. 
The similarity analysis thus operates as copyright’s correlative 
framework, in which the defendant’s actions are examined through 
the lens of a right-duty relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. Note that one of the enduring features of the correlative 
setup is that the defendant’s wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s right are 
meant to derive from the same normative account.225 In other words, a 
defendant’s actions are a wrong only because they interfere with a 
plaintiff’s right, and the plaintiff’s right, in the relational sense, arises 
because of the defendant’s wrongdoing.226 To avoid the trap of an 
unending circularity in this formulation, the source of the right-duty 
relationship must therefore originate in a foundational value that 
forms the source of the relationship.227 Copyright’s welfarist-utilitarian 
ideal fails to pass muster here because it represents a “wider principle 
that applies to anything whose normative significance is not 
correlatively structured.”228 In other words, copyright’s utilitarian 
ideal may comport with granting a creator a right, to enhance social 
welfare, but it says very little about what shape that right needs to 
take and indeed the conditions under which an interference with it is 
to be considered an actionable injustice.229 As Weinrib observes in 
relation to tort law: 
Of course, having a right contributes to a person’s welfare by 
protecting some interest from wrongful interference. . . . That, 
however, does not mean that rights are synonymous with aspects of 
welfare or that their normative significance is to be understood in 
terms of it. In the law’s contemplation, the increase in welfare 
through having a right and the decrease through the infringement of 
a right are the consequences rather than the grounds of the right.230 
This reasoning makes perfect sense in the copyright context. 
Were the law’s concern exclusively welfare driven, it might have 
 
 225. Weinrib, supra note 220, at 110; see also WEINRIB, supra note 220, at 123 (“When right 
and duty operate as correlatives, they constitute an articulated unity.”).  
 226. Weinrib, supra note 220, at 117. 
 227. See WEINRIB, supra note 220, at 124. 
 228. Id. at 112. 
 229. For a fuller explication of this idea, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normative 
Structure of Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013).  
 230. Weinrib, supra note 220, at 120. 
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readily abandoned any insistence on copying being necessary to 
trigger liability. The answer must therefore be sought in values that 
are capable of instantiation in correlative or relational terms. Weinrib 
finds the answer—for tort law—to lie not in welfare but in the idea of 
“personality” or purposiveness in action.231 The individual actor’s 
capacity for purposive action, without regard to specific ends or 
purposes, is thought to provide correlativity with its foundational 
value, which in turn forms the normative basis of the right-duty 
relationship that it revolves around.232 
The question then is whether this logic has any traction in 
relation to copyright’s similarity analysis. In applying the correlativity 
idea to copyright law, Professor Abraham Drassinower argues that 
the logic of purposive action can account for copyright law’s idea-
expression dichotomy and defense of independent creation.233 
Observing that “[t]he intersubjectivity of copyright is structured as an 
irreducible correlativity of legal right and duty,” he argues that 
copyright law’s belief in the ideal of equality in authorship explains 
these doctrinal elements.234 The defendant and plaintiff are both 
considered purposive authors, and consequently the plaintiff’s 
entitlement—even though rights-based—is nonetheless limited by the 
principal of equality, or the idea that the law needs to leave sufficient 
room for each actor to express herself without simultaneously 
interfering with the expression of others.235 
Much of the same logic applies to copyright’s analysis of 
actionable similarity as well. Recall that the test requires the decision 
maker to focus on whether the copying in question took material of 
“substance” and “value” from the plaintiff’s work.236 Yet, the fact of 
the matter remains that these variables are not necessarily 
coterminous with any of copyright’s fundamental filters to 
copyrightability—such as the originality requirement, the idea-
expression dichotomy, or indeed the exclusion of utilitarian elements 
from protection. Assessing the substance and value of a work thus 
involves looking beyond these filters to what makes a work 
worthwhile to its creator. All the same, doing so in the general or in 
 
 231. Id. at 113–21.  
 232. Id. at 112. 
 233. Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in 
Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3, 4 (2003). 
 234. Id. at 9, 12. 
 235. Id. at 12–18. 
 236. See supra Part I. 
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the abstract is often difficult, meaning that the scrutiny will vary from 
one class of works to another, and indeed from one individual work 
to another even within a single class. The idea of “substance and 
value” in a work is often narrowly understood to correlate to a work’s 
economic value in the market, with the requirement then understood 
as merely one of determining whether the defendant copied 
economically valuable portions of a work. Yet, as Nimmer points out, 
it is often impossible to determine when the economic value of a work 
has been sensibly damaged by a defendant’s mere copying.237 
Indeed, when one traces the origins of the requirement back to 
Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh,238 it becomes apparent that his use 
of the idea of “value” was not meant to direct the scrutiny solely 
toward the economic effects of the appropriation.239 As an alternative 
to assessing whether the value of a work was “sensibly diminished,” 
he also proposed examining whether “the labors of the original 
author [were] substantially to an injurious extent appropriated.”240 
First, the emphasis on “sensibly” diminished as part of the inquiry 
seems to suggest that the diminution in value needs to be perceivable 
to the decision maker in some ways, rather than a mere probabilistic 
assessment of the likely impact that the copying will have on the 
market for the plaintiff’s work. That this is true is also demonstrated 
by the economic inquiry being the gravamen of the independent fair-
use doctrine, under which courts are mandated to examine the 
potential effects of a defendant’s actions on the plaintiff’s market.241 
To require a court to undertake that examination twice thus makes 
little sense. Second, the reference to the labors of the original author 
seems to suggest that the focus of the inquiry ought to be on the 
reasons why an author considers the work important—since the most 
 
 237. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[A][2][a] (“[T]his oft-repeated principle 
does not tell the trier of fact when in any given instance the value of the original is sensibly 
diminished or injuriously appropriated. The trier must ultimately determine the importance of 
that material that is common to both parties’ works.”). 
 238. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 239. Id. at 346 (reasoning that “[e]ven in compositions confessedly literary, [an] author may 
not intend . . . them for publication; and yet, no one on that account doubts his right of property 
therein, as a subject of value to himself and to his posterity”).  
 240. Id. at 348. 
 241. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”); Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).  
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labor-intensive parts of a work need not always correspond to the 
most economically valuable. 
The substance and value examination is thus in effect an inquiry 
into the relationship between the author and the work and the question 
whether the defendant’s actions amount to an interference with that 
relationship. It thus derives from the same concept of 
intersubjectivity, except that the focus on equality of authorship and 
personality finds emphasis on the plaintiff’s side. The act of producing 
a work of creative expression—the act of expressing oneself—is the 
focus of the protection at this stage, rather than the consequences or 
effects of such expression in the marketplace or beyond. The 
intersubjectivity, or interpersonal comparison that the scrutiny 
entails, is mediated through the works in question but originates in 
the author-work connection that is the basis of the plaintiff’s 
entitlement. 
The author-work connection that the similarity scrutiny entails 
can be understood to be a largely deontological one. Yet, the beauty 
of the two-pronged substantial-similarity formulation is that this 
consideration influences the functioning of the system only after the 
threshold questions of instrumental purpose seen in the thickness 
inquiry are satisfied. In other words, the deontological questions 
operate not in the abstract but rather purely in the bilateral and 
relational setting of comparing the defendant’s actions with the 
plaintiff’s. 
Viewing the wrongfulness inquiry as a corrective-justice-driven 
inquiry deriving from the author-work connection and a defendant’s 
interference with it allows room for a set of values that have hitherto 
been thought to be incompatible with copyright law in the United 
States.242 One such value is corrective justice, which informs the very 
normative structure of the rights-based inquiry at this stage of the 
analysis. Yet, as some have pointed out, corrective justice does not 
independently address the normative content of the right, even 
though it focuses on the structure through which it is effectuated.243 
To fill this void, explanations for the right that derive directly 
from the author-work connection begin to assume relevance. One 
 
 242. See Drassinower, supra note 233, at 3 (observing how rights-based or natural-rights-
based theories of copyright law have little traction in the North American context because the 
incentives/utilitarian rationale dominates the landscape). 
 243. Jules L. Coleman, Intellectual Property and Corrective Justice, 78 VA. L. REV. 283, 285 
(1992). 
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such idea here is the labor-based explanation, in which the measure of 
wrongfulness focuses on the elements of a work in which the author 
has invested greatest time and effort—an idea often traced back to 
Justice Story.244 Another alternative is the idea of “moral personality” 
found in Kantian accounts of copyright law and thought to lie at the 
heart of droit d’auteur regimes of protection.245 Note that this value 
would not mean that heightened protection is extended to parts of the 
work that represent an author’s individual personality, but rather that 
some parts of the work better represent the principle of authorship 
and the moral agency that accompanies it; these latter parts are to be 
weighed more heavily during the similarity analysis. Nonutilitarian 
values thus find recognition in this stage of the inquiry on a relational 
basis. 
The key point to remember here is that the conception of the 
author’s rights at this stage of the inquiry is limited to the relational 
setting. Similarity is a relational inquiry, which allows the right-duty 
relationship to inform it as a substantive matter. The similarity 
inquiry can thus be understood to be rights based only in relational 
terms, and not in the consequentialist sense that the idea of a rights-
based approach is often used.246 The author’s rights argument for 
copyright protection is routinely thought of in absolute terms and 
almost never conceptualized bilaterally.247 Indeed, by connecting it to 
Hegel’s notion of personhood as a justification for property—itself an 
absolute interest—the interest comes to be conceptualized in terms 
analogous to property as a natural-rights-based claim.248 Yet 
personality, much like other deontological interests, is perfectly 
capable of being understood and analyzed in bilateral, relational 
 
 244. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). For other labor-based 
explanations of copyright law, see generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1533 (1993); and Yen, supra note 189.  
 245. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1067–68 (2008). 
 246. For an interesting discussion of the idea of “rights-based” approaches to copyright, 
dispelling some of the common mistakes that this entails, see Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ 
Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American Law 
Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 553–56 (2006). 
 247. Indeed, this is manifested in the Copyright Act’s own limited recognition of author’s 
rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . shall have the 
right . . . to claim authorship of that work . . . .”). 
 248. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–39 
(1988); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958–59 
(1982). 
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terms.249 The main analytical difference between the two is that 
whereas the relational conception is predicated on the identification 
and rectification of harm, the absolutist conception is thought to 
operate independent of any harm or infraction. The evolution of 
privacy as an interest protected by the law independent of property is 
a good example of the former.250 The privacy interest came to be 
understood and protected by reference to a set of actions that were 
designed to protect the right “to be let alone,” which analytically 
anticipated an invasion.251 The personality interest can be conceived 
of in analogous terms. While it does not form the basis for the 
abstract right, it nonetheless remains an important interest that 
copyright law seeks to protect relationally against interferences. 
A rights-based, correlatively structured similarity analysis might, 
on the face of things, be seen as requiring decision makers to 
undertake a qualitative, aesthetic judgment of the work, precisely the 
kind of inquiry that Justice Holmes is known to have cautioned 
against in his formulation of copyright’s nondiscrimination principle 
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.252 On closer examination, 
though, the fact that the similarity analysis is structured as a purely 
factual inquiry—relegated to the jury whenever possible—actually 
sits well with Justice Holmes’s admonition. Because the assessment is 
not made by “persons trained only to the law,”253—that is, judges, 
except when sitting in their capacity as fact finders—the similarity 
analysis in this formulation remains perfectly compliant with the non-
discrimination principle. Additionally, Holmes’ concerns about 
discriminating between different works seemed to stem from the 
binary structure of the inquiry he was presented with in that 
casenamely, whether the work was entitled to protection or not.254 
Because the similarity inquiry here is structured in relational terms, it 
works less as a denial of all protection to a work and more as a 
situational determination of liability, perhaps reducing the rigor of 
Justice Holmes’ concerns. 
 
 249. See, e.g., Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143, 146–47 
(2010). 
 250. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 251. Id. at 195. 
 252. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). 
 253. Id. at 251. 
 254. See id. 
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Understanding the similarity inquiry as deriving from copyright’s 
nonutilitarian values also explains why this stage of the substantial-
similarity examination consciously avoids relying on expert 
testimony.255 Determining which parts of a work demonstrate a 
greater connection to the author’s agency, and whether the 
defendant’s actions interfere with it, is entirely a question of 
subjective judgment, peculiar to the work and authors in question. 
Expert testimony is therefore unlikely to be particularly helpful given 
the individualized comparison that this task involves. Far more useful 
to the determination is evidence about the author’s creative process, 
something that is routinely introduced to aid the analysis.256 
3. Justifying the Sequencing.  Separating the utilitarian and 
personality-based goals of copyright law in substantial similarity’s 
two-step analysis allows courts to order the introduction of these 
incommensurables into the adjudicative process. Yet, conceptual 
sequencing is different from conceptual ordering. The process thus 
has to account not just for the separation of the inquiry but also for 
the particular sequence in which the variables are considered.257 In 
other words, it needs to be able to explain why it is that substantial 
similarity does not begin with the personality ideal and then look to 
its utilitarian goals in the second step. 
Appreciating the rationale behind the sequence necessitates 
getting to the bottom of copyright law’s normative foundations. 
Unlike its civil-law counterparts, in which the connection between an 
author and the work is thought to generate an inalienable right that is 
natural—in the sense of being nonpositive in its origin258—Anglo-
American copyright law views the source of the author’s entitlement 
to be rooted entirely within positive law.259 In contrast to laws that 
create wrongs in relation to prestatutory interests such as tort or 
antidiscrimination law, the copyright statute both identifies the four 
corners of the interest it protects and delineates actions that it treats 
 
 255. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). But see Lemley, supra note 15, at 
29–30. 
 256. See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 257. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1505 (“A conceptually sequenced argument might 
provide a quite different sort of ordering for decisionmaking from that provided by a value 
ordering.”). 
 258. See Monta, supra note 28, at 178. 
 259. See id. 
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as interferences with that interest.260 The copyright statute’s grant of 
exclusive rights thus exhausts the gamut of the creator’s rights under 
United States copyright law.261 And because the statute’s primary—if 
not exclusive—purpose lies in its utilitarian, welfare-based ideal,262 the 
recognition or grant of an interest originates there. The personality 
interest is, in other words, worthy of recognition only if the 
fundamental utilitarian purpose is realized. Without a fundamental 
utilitarian purpose being served, the investment of personality into 
creative expression is simply not worthy of protection. This is in 
contrast to other areas of the law, such as tort law and criminal law, in 
which the positive legal regime is trying to protect rights and interests 
that are prepositive—which in turn accounts for why any conceptual 
sequencing in adjudicating claims in those contexts begins with the 
right and then introduces utilitarian considerations.263 
This argument treats the institution of copyright as a positive 
construct and the wrongfulness of copying as devoid of any 
independent moral connotations. In other words, expressive copying 
is wrong because the law treats it as such.264 Indeed, this positivist 
approach to copyright law has been a mainstay of the American 
tradition, manifested in the language of the Constitution’s Copyright 
Clause, and formed the basis of the law’s rejection of the idea of 
“common law copyright” for works covered by the statute.265 To the 
extent that notions of moral wrongfulness or the like enter the 
equation, they do so entirely on terms determined by the law and 
never independent of it. 
In following the sequence that it does, substantial similarity thus 
allows copyright law to prioritize the good over the right. The conflict 
between the good and the right has long remained at the center of the 
debate between utilitarianism and other deontologically oriented 
approaches.266 The ideal of the good represents a commitment to 
 
 260. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
only rights that exist under copyright law are those granted by statute.”). 
 261. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (“Congress, then, by this act, 
[Act of 1790,] instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it.”). 
 262. See sources cited supra note 159.  
 263. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1512–20. 
 264. For more on the general idea of a legal wrong and its significance as a matter of 
positivism, see generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 141. 
 265. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 661–62. 
 266. See generally DAVID ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (2002); John Rawls, The 
Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251 (1988). 
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consequences of a certain kind, whereas the ideal of the right 
represents the belief that there remains an unconditional or 
categorical moral virtue in actions or decisions that can and should be 
divorced from their consequences.267 Whereas deontology emphasizes 
the priority of the right over the good, utilitarianism does just the 
opposite—by prioritizing the good over the right.268 In adhering to the 
two-step sequence, copyright law can be seen to be following its 
foundational utilitarian purpose. 
The inquiry’s prioritization of the good over the right via a 
sequenced ordering of considerations should not, however, be taken 
to imply that the ideas of the right and the good are somehow 
converted into neat, watertight categories as a functional matter. 
Indeed, one of the earliest criticisms of Kant’s theory of the 
“categorical imperative,” in which he posited the superiority of the 
right over the good, was attacked precisely for its inability to 
demarcate the practical basis for the right independent of assessments 
of the good.269 One thus should not expect the demarcation to become 
any clearer in copyright law just because the order is now reversed. If 
anything, the normative purity of the rights-based account is likely to 
be diluted as a result of the sequenced ordering, since the rights-based 
considerations are instantiated within a very limited domain. 
For copyright, though, this should be viewed as more of a benefit 
than a cost. Instead of letting rights-based considerations have 
unbounded importance during the decision-making process—which in 
turn might run afoul of the Constitution’s strong utilitarian 
mandate—conceptual sequencing limits their operation to the 
correlative domain, in the process forcing them to operate within the 
utilitarian framework of the institution. In so doing, it no doubt gives 
them a distinctively utilitarian purpose, something that even the most 
ardent supporters of rights-based considerations in copyright law 
acknowledge as necessary to ensure the system’s compliance with the 
Constitution.270 
*  *  * 
Reconceptualizing copyright’s substantial-similarity analysis as a 
conceptually sequenced ordering of plural considerations in the 
 
 267. Charles Larmore, The Right and the Good, 20 PHILOSOPHIA 15, 15–16 (1990).  
 268. See GERASIMOS SANTAS, GOODNESS AND JUSTICE: PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND THE 
MODERNS 155 (2001). 
 269. See Larmore, supra note 267, at 19. 
 270. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 191, at 1991. 
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infringement analysis reveals how copyright law is able to successfully 
accommodate both utilitarian and rights-based considerations. 
Instead of forcing the analysis to lexically prioritize one set of 
concerns over the other, or to balance them in some kind of direct 
tradeoff, it allows courts to restrict the prioritization to the temporal 
sequence and then give each set of concerns adequate attention at 
different stages of the inquiry. 
Copyright’s dominant explanatory theory is today no doubt 
utilitarian, according to which the institution exists principally to 
induce the production of creative works at minimal social cost via the 
market.271 Yet, much like the economic explanation for tort law, this 
utilitarian account of copyright law is hard-pressed to explain 
copyright’s intrinsic bipolarity constraint: the reality that the private-
law-based plaintiff-defendant structure represents its chosen vehicle 
to realize its utilitarian goals.272 If tort law is entirely about ensuring 
efficient deterrence, why tie a plaintiff’s recovery to actual harm, 
rather than the level of deterrence necessary? In a similar vein, if 
copyright law is entirely about inducing creativity by allowing 
plaintiff-creators to recover for copying, why limit the recovery to the 
harm from a defendant’s copying rather than the optimal inducement 
necessary for creation?273 Indeed in copyright law, we might even go 
one step further and ask why the system should emphasize copying at 
all, instead of carving out a market monopoly for the creator. This 
bipolarity constraint is thought to represent the fact that copyright 
law, much like tort law, represents a private-law institution 
attempting to further public-oriented goals.274 Consequently, its 
explanatory and functional accounts need to remain sensitive to both 
the public-purpose and private-law dimensions.275 The sequenced 
introduction of utilitarian and rights-based values through substantial 
similarity is an important way by which this accommodation is 
achieved. 
 
 271. See Balganesh, supra note 156, at 1577–78 (“Copyright, it is argued, exists to provide 
creators with an incentive to create and disseminate their works publicly.”). 
 272. See PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 11–12 (1997); JULES L. COLEMAN, 
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 
13 (2001). For a fuller discussion of bipolarity and its connection to broader public goals, see 
Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 811–13 (2008). 
 273. Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1168–70. 
 274. See Balganesh, supra note 229, at 20; Dagan, supra note 272, at 813 (making a similar 
claim about private law generally).  
 275. Balganesh, supra note 229, at 23. 
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III.  THE BENEFITS OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
Having seen how substantial similarity embodies an 
underappreciated structural dimension of the copyright entitlement 
and allows utilitarian and rights-based considerations to enter into the 
infringement analysis, we now move to identifying the benefits that 
are likely to flow from it. The advantages that are likely to accrue to 
the copyright system from this process are both formal and 
substantive. This Part identifies and discusses three such benefits of 
this analytical process: (i) it is likely to result in courts and judges 
exhibiting a greater degree of candor and forthrightness about the 
values that they are seeking to instantiate in the functioning of 
copyright law; (ii) it enables the bifurcation of copyright law’s 
guidance for upstream and downstream actors; and (iii) it will allow 
the fair-use doctrine to focus on considerations unique to the 
defendant’s actions, the core of a “defense.” 
A. Fine Tuning Copyright’s Upstream and Downstream Guidance 
As an incentive mechanism for creativity, copyright law is 
concerned with guiding behavior. Its promise of limited market 
exclusivity is thought to guide behavior by encouraging the very 
production of new creative works among authors.276 Yet, this promise 
represents only one side of the story. As a mechanism of liability, 
copyright law is also about signaling to potential defendants the range 
of behavior that will be tolerated before liability is imposed.277 It thus 
operates as an incentive not just for independent creativity but also 
for sequential or derivative creativity, in which defendants use and 
copy protected work in producing their own works. The distinction 
between the two incentive effects may usefully be characterized as 
“upstream” and “downstream,” respectively.278 
Copyright’s upstream-guidance function seems to pose few 
problems in practice. Its promise of some protection for minimal 
amounts of creativity in expression forms a fairly robust signal to 
 
 276. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) 
(“Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce 
their works, they are given an incentive to create . . . .”). 
 277. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, (1994) (“Because copyright law ultimately 
serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is 
peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as 
possible.”).  
 278. Balganesh, supra note 142, at 69. 
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potential creators. On the downstream side, though, copyright’s 
guidance for potential defendants has long been known to be 
problematic. Despite its being copyright’s principal safety valve, the 
cost-benefit analysis that fair use entails is often largely 
unpredictable.279 This in turn contributes to a significant degree of risk 
aversion, stifling what may be otherwise socially productive forms of 
using the protected work.280 A sequenced ordering of copyright’s goals 
through the substantial-similarity inquiry is likely to go some distance 
in alleviating this concern and in further fine tuning copyright’s 
upstream incentives. 
The second part of the substantial-similarity inquiry—the 
similarity analysis—can be seen as generating a distinct set of 
relational directives aimed exclusively at potential defendants—or, 
downstream creators. Unlike simple directives that operate in the 
nature of abstract prohibitions on certain kinds of conduct, for 
example, do not speed, relational directives are aimed at specific 
individuals, in an effort to protect their legal interests, for example, 
do not injure X.281 Tort law is said to consist of relational directives 
that impose relational legal duties on individuals to act or refrain 
from acting in a certain way.282 
It is crucial to appreciate the idea of a relational directive and to 
distinguish it from its simplistic characterization as a liability rule in 
the Calabresi-Melamed framework.283 The law’s mere imposition of 
liability for certain actions does not imply that individuals do not view 
themselves as being under an obligation to obey the law. In other 
words, individuals are very often motivated to comply with the law 
 
 279. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 
1491–1502 (2007). 
 280. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1092–1122 (2007) 
(“While the doctrine’s attention to context has many salutary attributes, it is so case-specific 
that it offers precious little guidance about its scope to artists, educators, journalists, Internet 
users, and others who require use of another’s copyrighted expression in order to communicate 
effectively.”).  
 281. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 59–60 (1998). 
 282. For more on the idea of relational directives and their significance in tort law, see id. at 
59–60; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 141, at 945–46. 
 283. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (“Whenever 
someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined 
value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”). 
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because it is the law and it speaks to them as a set of directives.284 In 
pioneering work, Professor Dale Nance showed how the simplified 
understanding of all tort law as liability rules failed to capture this 
distinction, which he classified as the distinction between “guidance 
rules” and “enforcement rules.”285 Whereas enforcement rules are 
directed at recalcitrant actors, guidance rules are directed at 
individuals who seek to order their lives to remain in compliance with 
the law.286 Thus the tort laws of battery or fraud no doubt remain 
structured as regimes of liability for certain actions, yet one would be 
hard-pressed to argue that they do not generate relational directives 
to individuals not to perform those actions. So it is with copyright too. 
Although it is no doubt a regime of liability, copyright’s emphasis 
on copying operates as a relational directive to potential copiers. And 
the source of that relational directive originates in the similarity phase 
of the substantial-similarity analysis. By consciously refraining from 
rendering all forms of copying actionable, the analysis directs 
individuals to refrain from copying another’s protected expression 
only when it amounts to an interference with that person’s interests, 
which the similarity analysis in turn identifies in terms of the 
“substance” and “essence” of a work.287 By identifying the plaintiff’s 
right in terms of the substance and essence of the work, the 
substantial-similarity analysis imposes its correlative duty as a 
relational directive on potential copiers. 
One may wonder whether the relational directive communicated 
by the similarity analysis reduces the indeterminacy of the 
entitlement in any significant way at all. In practice, it indeed does—
over time. In applying the similarity analysis to individual cases, 
courts have come to recognize that the substance and essence of 
different categories of works—those that are capable of taking color 
from rights-based considerations—are likely manifested in certain 
specific parts of the protected expression.288 For instance, in relation 
 
 284. Zipursky, supra note 281, at 58. For a detailed explication of this idea in copyright law. 
see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the 
Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1674 (2012). 
 285. Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 
83 VA. L. REV. 837, 861 (1997). 
 286. Id. at 858. 
 287. See supra Part I.C. 
 288. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, §§ 4:1–4.9 (“The evaluation of the total 
concept and feel of the works at issue generally is an assessment of the protected expression 
revealed by examination of the seven concrete elements.”). 
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to literary and dramatic works of fiction, courts have over time come 
to focus on seven different factors to assess the substance and 
essence: plot and sequence of events, dialogue, characters, theme, 
mood, setting, and pace.289 Similarly, for sculptures with human forms, 
the analysis tends to emphasize the portrayal of the human form, such 
as facial features and expression, in determining the essence of the 
work.290 
None of this, to be sure, comes close to the certainty that might 
be offered by a bright-line rule. Yet it marks a major improvement 
over the guidance directives of fair use in two important respects. 
First, unlike the fair-use doctrine, the focus here remains on the 
works themselves rather than surrounding circumstances that may 
have no bearing on the creative process. A large part of the 
uncertainty surrounding fair use originates in these variables that are 
disconnected from the work itself, for example, market harm, 
potential market, purpose, and so forth.291 Second, in contrast to fair 
use, the similarity analysis is frozen in time and fixed at the point in 
time that the work was created. Consequently, the predictive element 
that the similarity inquiry entails is static, unlike in the fair use 
context in which it is dynamic and capable of significant variation 
over time.292 
Additionally, the thickness determination also serves to fine tune 
copyright’s upstream incentive structure for creators. By granting 
greater protection to works that better serve copyright’s utilitarian 
goals, the thickness requirement—at least in theory—sends a signal to 
creators to ensure that their works meet these goals in order to obtain 
maximally thick protection. It thus creates an incentive to be more 
creative, to produce more expressive—as opposed to ideational—
content, and indeed to better meet any additional requirements that 
courts might introduce into the utilitarian calculus.293 
 
 289. Id. § 4:1; see also Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 297 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. Lindhein, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th 
Cir. 1990). 
 290. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 10:3.  
 291. See Carroll, supra note 280, at 1101–06. 
 292. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 787–88 (2003).   
 293. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 91, at 1534 (making a similar claim in relation to 
a tiered system of originality). 
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B. Candor and Clarity in Copyright Reasoning 
In innumerable copyright-infringement suits, courts routinely 
confront a dilemma: on the one hand, it often is not clear that the 
plaintiff’s work deserves full protection under copyright law. At the 
same time, though, the defendant’s act of copying is palpably 
egregious: willful, anticompetitive, or a verbatim reproduction of the 
plaintiff’s work in its entirety. In these situations, two of which are 
discussed below, denying the plaintiff all protection would fail to 
communicate the law’s disapproval of the defendant’s actions. But 
simply finding the defendant’s actions to constitute infringement 
might have the effect of according the plaintiff’s work more 
protection than it merits. 
Copyright’s binary mechanisms only serve to exacerbate this 
dilemma. The idea of copyrightability, even when measured through 
its various components such as originality or the idea-expression 
dichotomy, is often viewed as an all-or-nothing determination.294 
Additionally, the tendency among courts to view the copyright 
entitlement entirely in its abstract, nonrelational formulation also 
contributes to this. Copyright’s entitlement is perceived to be 
attached exclusively to the work and rarely ever as equally influenced 
by the bipolar or correlative structure of the claim. Thus, in 
attempting to balance these competing concerns, courts are invariably 
forced to draw artificial distinctions or to create categories that run 
counter to copyright law’s core principles. Two prominent 
infringement cases best illustrate this phenomenon and how the 
courts’ uses of substantial similarity might have allowed each court to 
engage in significantly less idiosyncratic reasoning to reach its 
conclusion. 
The first of these was a case decided by the Seventh Circuit, 
American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n.295 The plaintiff 
association in the case had created a comprehensive code of dental 
procedures and nomenclatures. The code contained an encyclopedic 
index of all dental procedures and assigned each procedure a unique 
short description, a long description, and a number.296 The defendant 
association, which had participated in the creation of the plaintiff’s 
code, eventually created its own index of procedures, and in so doing 
 
 294. See supra notes 196–197. 
 295. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 296. Id. at 977–78. 
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copied the descriptions—both long and short—and numbers from the 
plaintiff’s work.297 Unhappy with this copying, the plaintiff 
commenced a copyright-infringement action against the defendant.298 
The district court concluded that the plaintiff’s code was 
uncopyrightable.299 Finding that it lacked any “modicum” of 
creativity, the court focused on the code’s utilitarian nature to 
conclude that it lost any semblance of originality once the form of the 
work was separated from its function.300 Recognizing that copyright 
law contained no explicit rule disallowing protection for utilitarian 
literary expression analogous to its rule denying protection to useful 
designs, the court used copyright’s admittedly vague “originality” 
requirement to reach a similar conclusion.301 
On appeal, Judge Frank Easterbrook took exception to this 
approach, which he viewed as conflating originality with 
functionality.302 His majority opinion began by setting out the absurd, 
economically disastrous consequences that would result from the 
denial of protection to works simply because they were functional in 
nature.303 Finding that there was indeed some amount of creativity in 
the plaintiff’s classification of dental procedures, he concluded that all 
three components of the plaintiff’s work were indeed copyrightable.304 
An obvious undertone in Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, however, 
is his emphasis on the amount of work and effort that went into the 
plaintiff’s code and on the robust market that exists for taxonomic 
works of the same nature. After detailing the various kinds of cost-
intensive, economically valuable taxonomies that exist in the market, 
he went to some pains to argue that “[c]lassification is a creative 
endeavor,” that the plaintiff’s choices in its classification weren’t 
dictated by logic, and that “[c]reativity marks the expression” even 
after these choices were made.305 Indeed, at one point in his 
description of the plaintiff’s choices, he noted how “[b]lood is shed in 
the [plaintiff’s] committees” over the choice of how to describe a 
 
 297. Id. 
 298. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, No. 92 C 5909, 1996 WL 224494 (N.D. 
Ill. May 1, 1996), vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 299. Id. at *17. 
 300. Id. at *9–17. 
 301. Id. at *8–9. 
 302. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 980. 
 303. Id. at 978–79. 
 304. Id. at 979. 
 305. Id. 
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procedure.306 Intriguingly, he went on to draw a distinction between a 
“taxonomy” and a “compilation,” arguing that the former contains 
materials that are incapable of existing independently, unlike the 
latter, and he rejected the argument that a taxonomy is an 
unprotectible “system,” noting instead that it is capable of being put 
to multiple uses.307 
Clearly important to Judge Easterbrook then was the fact that 
the defendant was a competitor of the plaintiff’s, rendering its actions 
anticompetitive in market terms, and the reality that the plaintiff had 
invested a good deal of effort and thought into its work, even if all of 
it wasn’t apparent on the face on the work itself. Yet explicitly 
acknowledging either of these concerns would have been 
problematic. Anticompetitive concerns are given no special emphasis 
in copyright law, and the plaintiff’s efforts alone render the work no 
more worthy of protection after Feist’s rejection of a “sweat of the 
brow” approach to copyrightability.308 
In reality though, both the lower-court and appellate-court 
opinions are equally disingenuous. Whereas the district court had 
consciously conflated originality and functionality, the Seventh 
Circuit chose to conflate originality with effort and used it as a proxy 
for market consequences. Yet both courts were seemingly troubled by 
the binary nature of the originality determination. To conclude that 
the work was indeed original was problematic to the district court in 
light of there being no infusion of “personal taste or judgment” by an 
individual author.309 But finding that there was no originality seemed 
just as problematic to the Seventh Circuit, from a purely 
consequentialist point of view, in light of the effects it might have had 
on the market for such indices and taxonomies—which Judge 
Easterbrook chose to place great emphasis on as a descriptive matter 
in his opinion.310 Both approaches to copyright reasoning were in 
some sense, then, dictated by the outcome that the court wanted to 
reach in the case. 
Had either court focused its attention on the substantial-
similarity analysis and the conceptually sequenced structure that the 
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analysis represents, it might have gone a long way in alleviating their 
respective concerns and perhaps rendering their respective reasoning 
less convoluted. This is not to imply that if both courts had focused on 
substantial similarity they would have reached the same conclusion. 
Rather, it would have brought their real concerns to the forefront of 
their analyses instead of masking them behind faux formalism. The 
district court’s concern was that the plaintiff’s work, the taxonomy, 
was not sufficiently creative, even though it had been copied in large 
measure (indeed, at times verbatim) by the defendant.311 The Seventh 
Circuit was, on the other hand, more concerned by the egregious 
nature of the copying, which appeared to be nothing more than the 
defendant free riding on the plaintiff’s labor-intensive efforts. Instead 
of forcing the work to be classified in a binary way as either original 
or unoriginal, substantial similarity—in its thickness determination—
would have had both courts focus on how original the work was, 
independent of the defendant’s copying. Here, it remains likely that 
both courts might have found the work to be minimally original and 
therefore entitled to very “thin” protection. This in turn would have 
set the standard of scrutiny for the similarity analysis at its strictest.312 
Yet, the facts revealed that the works were virtually identical, with 
the copying being very extensive.313 The district court opinion 
described the copying as “striking.”314 The copying was of the most 
labor-intensive parts of the work—its essence and value—giving 
effect to Judge Easterbrook’s concerns about protecting the plaintiff’s 
“endeavor” as well.315 
The effect of this sequenced and partitioned approach would 
have been that the plaintiff’s taxonomy obtained minimal protection 
against copying but certainly protection against anticompetitive 
copying, which forms the focus of the standard of scrutiny under thin 
copyright protection. Both the district and appellate courts might 
have had their concerns addressed—and explicitly so—in the process. 
A second case involves the merger doctrine, which also operates 
principally in binary terms. Either the idea and expression in a work 
are merged and the work is denied all protection, or the two are not 
 
 311. Am. Dental, 1996 WL 224494, at *8–9.  
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 314. Id. at *4. 
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merged and the work obtains full protection.316 In Kregos v. 
Associated Press,317 the plaintiff had created a form comprising 
various statistics on baseball pitchers, which the defendant was 
alleged to have copied in its own similar forms.318 The district court 
found for the defendant, and concluded that the plaintiff’s work was 
insufficiently original and creative to qualify for protection and that 
the idea and expression had “merged” in the work, which rendered it 
unprotectible under the merger doctrine.319 On appeal, the Second 
Circuit disagreed with the district court on both grounds. First, it 
found that the plaintiff’s selection of statistics to include in its form 
was sufficiently creative to meet the Feist standard.320 On the issue of 
the merger doctrine however, the court adopted something of a 
midway approach. 
On the one hand, the court was confronted with the argument 
that the plaintiff’s creative selection of statistical data represented its 
idea, and not its expression.321 The district court had found the 
plaintiff’s idea to be “an outcome predictive pitching form,” which 
had merged with the expression in the actual form.322 The Second 
Circuit chose to construct the plaintiff’s idea in more abstract terms, 
and in the process found there to be multiple ways of expressing the 
idea—overcoming the merger doctrine. All the same, in abstracting to 
a higher level of generality, the court worried that it was in effect 
according protection to the plaintiff’s idea, theoretical distinctions 
aside.323 To overcome this, it then chose to distinguish between 
different kinds of ideas: those involving “matters of taste and 
personal opinion” and those that are more mundane, or run-of-the-
mill.324 In relation to the former, it concluded that the costs of 
overprotection were minimal—because the idea was in some sense 
original—and therefore of less concern under the merger doctrine. In 
essence, the court created a new category of “original ideas” that 
 
 316. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[B][3]. 
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could now obtain protection despite the merger doctrine.325 Other 
courts have since built on this classification and extended it to new 
contexts.326 
Undoubtedly, the Second Circuit’s concerns were legitimate. On 
the one hand, characterizing the plaintiff’s contribution as an idea 
would result in it being denied protection, despite the reality that the 
plaintiff had in some sense invested his own personality into the work 
and which the defendant had seemingly copied. Denying it protection 
would thus legitimate the defendant’s copying of what was original to 
the plaintiff, even if in the realm of ideas. On the other hand, 
according it full protection ran the risk of neglecting the merger 
doctrine, which had strong roots in copyright’s utilitarian concern 
with minimizing monopoly costs.327 
Once again, a focus on substantial similarity might have 
alleviated these concerns to a large degree and avoided the creation 
of an altogether new category, which now at least on the face of 
things pits the idea-expression dichotomy and the originality 
requirements at odds with each other, even though they both 
originate in the same set of utilitarian concerns. The court might have 
begun with the understanding that the work was entitled to a “highly 
discerning” standard of protection because it consisted of original and 
nonoriginal material and indeed its idea and expression were far from 
being clearly distinguishable. Adopting this standard of scrutiny 
would have protected the work against copying by the defendant if 
such copying was shown to be of the most qualitatively significant and 
protectible parts of the work, which the plaintiff would have had little 
problem establishing. The defendant’s copying had extended to parts 
of the workthe selection and coordinationthat had been infused 
with the plaintiff’s own “taste and personal opinion,” which according 
to the court represented the most valuable parts of the plaintiff’s 
work.328 Indeed, the court might have even found the defendant’s 
copying to be so extensive as to satisfy the heightened standard of 
scrutiny under the standard of “thin” protection. 
 
 325. Id. 
 326. See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 70–73 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
 327. See supra note 192. 
 328. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707. 
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Interestingly enough, after remand, both the district court329 and 
the court of appeals330 adopted precisely this approach, and focused 
their analyses on the defendant’s substantial similarity. Although 
neither court made explicit reference to the thickness of the plaintiff’s 
entitlement in the compilation, the concept of thickness seems 
pervasive in both opinions. On remand, the district court began by 
noting the defendant’s concession that one of its works was “virtually 
identical” to the plaintiff’s—a likely allusion to the thin copyright 
doctrine.331 In relation to the other work, the court decided to 
examine the existence of the requisite “legal similarity” between the 
two works, and on dissecting the work and weighing its parts 
differently, that is, applying a discerning standard, found for the 
defendant because the similarity, if any, related entirely to the 
unprotectible parts of the work.332 Somewhat surprisingly, on appeal 
from this decision, the Second Circuit affirmed.333 The “unease” that 
had motivated its creation of a new category in its previous opinion334 
had now—with the focus shifting from the absolute copyrightability 
of the plaintiff’s work to the relative wrongfulness of the copying—
disappeared altogether. 
Both these cases together reveal how the substantial-similarity 
analysis is capable of balancing the competing concerns that courts 
routinely encounter in a copyright dispute, principally as a result of 
the dispute’s bilateral structure. A more extensive use of substantial 
similarity is thus likely to imbue the copyright decision-making 
process with a significantly greater degree of candor than before. 
C. Streamlining Fair Use 
An increased reliance on substantial similarity by courts is also 
likely to indirectly streamline the fair-use doctrine and introduce a 
measure of coherence into its operation. Although it remains 
copyright’s primary safety valve, fair use is routinely described by 
courts and scholars as copyright law’s “most troublesome” doctrine.335 
 
 329. Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
 330. Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993).   
 331. Kregos, 795 F. Supp. at 1332. 
 332. Id. at 1332–34. 
 333. Kregos, 3 F.3d at 663–64. 
 334. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 335. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984); Dellar v. 
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).  
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Fair use originated as an equitable rule of reason that vested a good 
degree of discretion in courts to relax the stringency of the copyright 
entitlement whenever circumstances demanded.336 Yet, in due course 
it came to be understood as an affirmative defense, the burden for 
which lay with the defendant.337 Accordingly, in a copyright-
infringement suit, the plaintiff is expected to establish the 
requirements of a prima facie case without any mention of fair use, 
after which the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the 
copying ought to be classified as fair use.338 On the face of things, fair 
use seems to introduce an additional layer of defeasibility into the 
copyright entitlement—along the lines of the common law’s 
traditional rules on pleadings and presumptions.339 
The problem, however, is that the fair-use determination—at 
least as codified today—makes use of factors and variables that are 
legitimately examined as part of the substantial-similarity 
determination.340 This sits rather oddly with its structure as an 
affirmative defense. If fair use is indeed no more than a defense to 
infringement—implying that it only ever enters the picture after a 
prima facie entitlement is found to exist for the plaintiff and the 
defendant specifically invokes it—then having courts reconsider some 
of the same issues that they did under their preliminary analysis of the 
entitlement seems highly redundant and palpably illogical.341 
The second and third fair-use factors are prime examples of this 
problem. The second factor requires courts to examine the “nature of 
the copyrighted work,” while the third asks them to consider “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole.”342 To this day, few courts have used the 
second factor in any meaningful way.343 They instead use it to 
summarily differentiate between purely factual and creative works, 
but then go on to place little weight on the factor in the overall 
analysis.344 In functional terms, this factor continues to remain the 
 
 336. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.  
 337. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, 
§ 13.05. 
 338. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, §§ 13.01, 13.05. 
 339. See Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1973). 
 340. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 341. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 342. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2)–(3). 
 343. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][2][a]. 
 344. Id. 
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least useful. What is interesting is that the thickness prong of the 
substantial-similarity inquiry has courts ask the exact same question 
as part of the prima facie case.345 The difference is that there, unlike in 
fair use, courts actually attach consequences, that is, the application 
of the appropriate standard of scrutiny, to their conclusion.346 
Although the third fair-use factor does have some functional 
significance, its overlap with the substantial-similarity inquiry is 
pervasive. Recall that the similarity analysis requires courts to 
examine the quantity and quality of the defendant’s copying in light 
of the copyrighted work as a whole.347 Yet this is exactly the inquiry 
demanded by the third fair-use factor.348 Recognizing this, the 
Eleventh Circuit has tried to restructure the inquiry as an 
examination of “whether the amount taken is reasonable in light of 
the purpose of the use and the likelihood of market substitution.”349 
Unsatisfactorily, this formulation does little more than redirect the 
third factor toward the first and fourth factors—producing a 
redundancy within the fair-use factors themselves! 
One solution to this overlap is to collapse fair use into the 
adjudication of the prima facie entitlement and to place the burden 
for it on the plaintiff—an idea that some have suggested before.350 
Given that this development is highly unlikely in light of the position 
that both Congress and the Supreme Court have taken on the issue,351 
a more pragmatic approach lies instead in streamlining the fair-use 
inquiry by having it focus on variables and elements for which the 
defendant is indeed best positioned to bear the burden. Leaving aside 
for a moment the issue of the overlap between fair use and substantial 
similarity, an additional problem in the structure of the second and 
third fair-use factors lies in its requiring the defendant to introduce 
 
 345. Id. § 13.05[A][4]; see also supra Part I.B. 
 346. See supra Part I.B. 
 347. See supra Part I.B. 
 348. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][3]. 
 349. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 
1287, 1314 n.30 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 350. For previous suggestions along these lines, see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, 
§ 12.11[F]; Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 969, 1028 (2007) (“Under the harm-based approach to fair use . . . the plaintiff should bear 
the burden in such cases to prove that such harm has occurred or is likely to occur.”); Harry N. 
Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of “Fair Use” in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 790, 801 (1975). 
 351. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 102-
836, at 3 n.3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2555 n.3. 
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evidence on issues about which the plaintiff holds all the information. 
The nature of the copyrighted work—if understood as an 
examination of the originality or creativity inherent in the work—
entails examining, among other things, the creative process involved 
in the production of the work. Similarly, the substantiality of the work 
as a portion of the copyrighted work as a whole is a question about 
the essence or heart of the copyrighted work, which the defendant 
may know very little about. It is inefficient and unproductive to have 
the defendant bear the burden of gathering information in the first 
instance about the plaintiff’s actions, simply as a procedural matter. 
Thus, in addition to the issue of redundancy, the second and third 
fair-use factors remain grossly inefficient, given the information 
asymmetry between the plaintiff and the defendant on the matters 
being examined. 
One way for fair use to remain an affirmative defense, while 
simultaneously avoiding the redundancies and inefficiencies identified 
above, is to have it share its role with substantial similarity. The 
second fair-use factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—
performs no meaningful role in the fair-use analysis, even when the 
factor is found to weigh in favor of the defendant.352 Yet, it is precisely 
the nature of the work on which the thickness prong of the 
substantial-similarity analysis focuses. And there, as we noted, it is 
routinely translated into a meaningful outcome: namely, a variation in 
the standard of scrutiny fixed for the similarity analysis. Courts 
applying the substantial-similarity analysis might thus legitimately 
ignore the second fair-use factor altogether, recognizing that all of 
what it constitutes is undertaken during the thickness analysis—
something that courts already do more-or-less expressly.353 The third 
fair-use factor can in turn be converted into a meaningful mechanism 
for courts to assess the extent to which the defendant relies on the 
copyrighted work in producing its own work. In other words, the third 
factor might be used to measure the amount and substantiality of the 
portion of the protected work used in relation to the defendant’s 
work as a whole.354 This move would allow the court to contextualize 
 
 352. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, §13.05[A][2][a]. 
 353. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (observing how the second factor is not of much 
help when the copying is of an expressive work); FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F. 
Supp. 2d 539, 579–80 (E.D. Pa. 2005).  
 354. For an example of a court actually using the factor this way, see the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 
1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). For a fuller discussion, see infra Part IV.B.3. 
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the defendant’s copying within the broader context and purpose of 
the copying, precisely along the lines alluded to by the Tenth 
Circuit.355 It would also in the process emphasize the idea, routinely 
operationalized by courts, that in some situations even the copying of 
a protected work in its entirety may constitute fair use.356 Looking to 
the defendant’s work in its entirety as a denominator for the inquiry 
would cause courts to instantiate this principle more fully on a regular 
basis. 
In turn, this structural bifurcation is likely to result in a more 
equitable and efficient sharing of burdens between the plaintiff and 
the defendant in copyright-infringement claims. It would also ensure 
that courts pay sufficient attention to both parties’ works rather than 
just the plaintiff’s. The thickness inquiry would have courts focus only 
on the plaintiff’s work, the similarity analysis on a comparison of the 
two works, and the fair-use inquiry exclusively on the defendant’s 
work and the values that it implicates. Although this streamlining will 
not eliminate all of the confusion that today surrounds fair use, it will 
at the very least serve to provide a fair bit of structural integrity to the 
fair-use doctrine, something that it currently lacks altogether. 
IV.  THE SEQUENCED SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY ANALYSIS IN 
ACTION 
Having examined the structure of substantial similarity as a 
mechanism of entitlement delineation and analyzed its virtues, this 
Part illustrates its functioning of substantial similarity by applying it 
to a landmark copyright law case decided by the Supreme Court, 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.357 In the decade-
and-a-half since it was handed down, Harper & Row has come to be 
understood as having adopted an excessively narrow, market-oriented 
approach to fair use.358 Scholars have struggled to make sense of the 
competing concerns that seemed to motivate the Court’s fair-use and 
free-speech reasoning.359 In this Part, I argue that the real failure in 
 
 355. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. 
 356. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][3]. 
 357. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).  
 358. See, e.g., NETANEL, supra note 1, at 64 (“[T]he Court adopted a crabbed, decidedly 
property-centered view of fair use.”).   
 359. See, e.g., id. at 64–65; Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 395–96 
(1999); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 
1789 (1988). 
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Harper & Row was architectural. The Court’s fundamental problem 
lay in its focusing on fair use as the copyright entitlement’s exclusive 
safety valve. Had it understood the entitlement to be a multilayered 
defeasible one—along the lines suggested in this Article—its 
reasoning would have been more streamlined, and its real motivations 
would have become more apparent. This is hardly to suggest simply 
that by employing the substantial-similarity analysis the Court would 
have necessarily reached a different result. It is very likely that the 
final outcome of the case would have remained the same—but for 
more cogent and defensible reasons. 
A. Moving Beyond Fair Use in Harper & Row 
The facts of Harper & Row are well known to any student of 
copyright law. President Gerald Ford had authored a memoir, titled 
A Time to Heal,360 for which he entered into a publishing agreement 
with the plaintiffs, Harper & Row. The memoir was meant to contain 
his personal account of the Watergate crisis, the pardoning of 
President Richard Nixon, and other connected events. The plaintiffs 
in turn entered into a prepublication agreement with Time magazine, 
under which the latter agreed to publish short excerpts from the 
memoir in its magazine about a week before the memoir was to be 
released publicly. Two or three weeks before the memoir was to be 
released, the defendant’s editor received an unauthorized copy of the 
final manuscript from an anonymous source.361 Knowing the material 
to be highly confidential and time sensitive, but nonetheless sensing a 
news opportunity, he hastily put together a news story of about 2250 
words, excerpting various quotes, details, paraphrases, and facts from 
the manuscript.362 When the defendant published its story, Time 
magazine immediately cancelled its prepublication agreement with 
the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs in turn commenced an action for 
copyright infringement—together with other state law claims—
against the defendant.363 
Discussions of Harper & Row today invariably focus on the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in the case and its conclusion that the 
defendant’s use did not constitute a fair use, despite the journalistic 
importance of the material and the allied First Amendment issues 
 
 360. GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL (1979). 
 361. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542–43. 
 362. Id. at 543. 
 363. Id. 
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involved.364 What is more relevant for our purposes is how the Court 
reached the question of fair use, an affirmative defense, and for which 
it would have had to reach a decision on the plaintiff’s prima facie 
entitlement. And here we see an unusually rich discussion of 
copyright’s basic architecture in the disagreement among the lower 
courts, which the singular focus on the Supreme Court’s opinion 
almost always ignores. 
After setting out the facts of the case, the district court moved 
almost immediately to the issue of fair use.365 Its discussion of the 
prima facie entitlement was limited to the observation that the work 
was “protected by copyright,” a proposition for which it cited the 
definition of a literary work and the fact that the transfer from the 
author to the publisher had been recorded.366 Moving to fair use, and 
running through the various factors enumerated in the statute, the 
district court then concluded that the defendant’s copying was not 
privileged as a fair use and found for the plaintiffs.367 
On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s 
failure to analyze the prima facie entitlement altogether.368 Yet, its 
opinion argued that the real focus of the dispute ought to have been 
on whether the plaintiff’s work was fundamentally “copyrightable” 
rather than on the defendant’s fair use.369 Its observation in this regard 
is telling: 
  The trial court began its opinion on copyright infringement by 
considering whether The Nation article was news reporting and, if 
so, whether The Nation had made a “fair use” of the memoirs. As a 
result, it did not face, at the outset, the threshold issue whether the 
material used by the magazine was copyrightable. We commence 
this part of our discussion, then, by turning our attention to that 
question, putting aside the matter of “fair use” until we have 
decided if any use of copyrighted expression did, in fact, occur.370 
Turning to the issue of copyrightability, the Second Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiff’s work consisted of both protected and 
 
 364. See supra notes 358–359. 
 365. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069–70 
(S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 366. Id. at 1069–70 & n.3. 
 367. Id. at 1070–72. 
 368. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1983), 
rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 369. Id.  
 370. Id.  
BALGANESH IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2012  10:51 AM 
278 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:203 
unprotected expression.371 Using this finding as its basis, it concluded 
that the defendant’s copying was of no more than three hundred 
protected words from the plaintiff’s work, and it used this conclusion 
in its own fair-use analysis.372 Thus, despite its avowed focus on 
copyrightability, the Second Circuit engaged in what was effectively a 
“filtration” exercise of eliminating unprotected material from the 
analysis altogether, without using this to vary the entitlement.373 
It is ironic that the court—at this stage of the analysis at least—
seemed to be on the right track. In making the move from 
copyrightability to fair use directly, though, it glossed over the 
question of copying, which it merged with the fair-use analysis. Thus, 
in its analysis of the second fair-use factor, the Second Circuit noted 
how protection for the work was “narrow,” without hinting at the 
consequence or manifestation of such narrow protection.374 Applying 
the fair-use factors to the defendant’s “infinitesimal” copying, the 
court concluded that the defendant had a valid fair-use claim in the 
case.375 
Given that the two lower courts had oscillated between fair use 
and copyrightability, one might have thought that the Supreme Court 
would choose to steer a midway position and focus on the question of 
“copying.” Instead, it dismissed the lower courts’ disagreement in 
overly simplistic terms as being about “originality” and observed 
early on that it did not need to “reach [those] issues” because the 
defendant had “admitted to lifting verbatim quotes of the author’s 
original language totaling between 300 and 400 words and 
constituting some 13% of [the defendant’s] article.”376 In this cryptic 
observation, the Court was conflating the questions of actual copying 
and substantial similarity—and treating the defendant’s admission on 
the former as going to the latter. 
Nonetheless, as part of the third fair-use factor, the Court did 
scrutinize the defendant’s copying.377 There, in examining the 
“amount and substantiality” of the work used by the defendant, the 
Court concluded that even though the copying was of a very small 
 
 371. See id. at 203. 
 372. Id. at 206. 
 373. See id. 
 374. Id. at 208. 
 375. Id. at 209. 
 376. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985). 
 377. Id. at 564–65. 
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fraction of the work, it related to material that constituted the “heart” 
of the work—endowing it with qualitative significance.378 In so doing, 
the Court was merely echoing the district court’s findings.379 What is 
interesting here is that the Court completely sidestepped the Second 
Circuit’s disagreement with the district court on this question—that is, 
whether the “heart” of the work could include unoriginal, and thus 
unprotected, materials. The Second Circuit had concluded that the 
“heart” of the work—even when copied by the defendant—
comprised factual material that was unprotected.380 The Court, on the 
other hand, completely ignored this discrepancy, thereby implicitly 
endorsing the position that the “heart” or “essence” of the work, 
during the analysis of copying, could consist of parts of the work 
other than the most original or creative parts—parts that the author 
considered the core, even if they were independently unprotectible. 
As discussed earlier, this position is more tenable under the 
substantial-similarity analysis owing to its sequenced, partition-
dependent structure;381 yet surprisingly, the Court adopted this 
position as part of its fair-use analysis. 
None of the three opinions, then, seem to have paid sufficient 
attention to the various moving parts of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
entitlement. The Second Circuit came closest, in describing the 
plaintiff’s protection as “narrow”—but then conflated the issues of 
copyrightability and copying. The district court unthinkingly moved 
directly to fair use. And the Supreme Court seems to have assumed 
the issue away in its analysis. Had substantial similarity been taken as 
a core part of the prima facie entitlement, each of the courts would 
have been forced to consider the issue of copying directly, regardless 
of what outcome they might have reached. The next Section details 
how this might have occurred. 
B. Harper & Row Through Copyright’s Sequenced Mechanisms 
Had the courts paid closer attention to delineating the plaintiff’s 
prima facie entitlement, it is very likely that they would have had to 
confront more directly the question of how much protection the 
memoir was entitled to receive. In so doing, they would have also 
 
 378. Id. at 565. 
 379. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.), 
rev’d, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 380. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 208. 
 381. See supra Part II. 
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eliminated much of the confusion that seems to have informed their 
fair-use analyses, allowing for a more coherent decision. Applying the 
substantial-similarity analysis would have allowed the courts to 
separate their inquiries into three separate steps: (i) thickness; (ii) 
similarity; and (iii) fair use. 
1. Thickness.  As the Court in Harper & Row noted, the 
defendant conceded that it did in fact copy from the plaintiff’s work.382 
Consequently, the question of probative copying could have been 
avoided. Yet the Court would have been called upon to determine the 
thickness of copyright protection that the work would obtain. And for 
this determination, it would have had to dissect—as opposed to 
filter—the work into its constituent elements. We saw how the 
Second Circuit attempted something similar—except that it went on 
to whittle down the plaintiff’s entitlement to its protectible parts.383 
Instead, the Court might have simply examined how much of the 
plaintiff’s work consisted of copyrightable expression, and how much 
of it contained unprotectible material. From the Second Circuit’s own 
analysis, it appears as though the work contained a significant amount 
of unprotectible content384—which, as noted earlier, would have 
necessitated the court’s application of an intermediate standard of 
scrutiny to the analysis of the defendant’s copying, or the approach of 
a “more discerning ordinary observer.”385 Instead of eliminating the 
unprotected materials from the analysis, the court would have simply 
accorded them negligible importance in the overall analysis. 
In so applying the thickness prong, the court might have thus 
indirectly given effect to copyright’s utilitarian mandate of ensuring 
that unoriginal, factual, or abstract content does not obtain 
protection—and is instead to remain in the public domain.386 The Ford 
memoir relied extensively on information and facts available in the 
public domain, and the original contribution lay in the author’s own 
personal reflections on these events.387 The work, in other words, 
furthered copyright’s utilitarian mandate only partially and thus 
would have been legitimately entitled to no more than an 
intermediate level of protection. 
 
 382. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548. 
 383. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 206. 
 384. Id. at 205–06. 
 385. See supra Part I.B. 
 386. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 387. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542. 
BALGANESH IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2012  10:51 AM 
2012] THE NORMATIVITY OF COPYING 281 
It is worth mentioning that the district court was likely alluding 
to this approach when it referred to the “totality” of the work that 
was protected by copyright law.388 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
thought this was “erroneous,” because it would have accorded the 
copyright holder a monopoly over unprotected materials.389 The 
Second Circuit’s logic seemed plausible only because it was looking at 
the issue of copyrightability and not at the defendant’s copying. Had 
it rightly focused on the question of copying—and the thickness of 
protection to which the work was entitled—the Second Circuit might 
have seen the logic in the district court’s totality argument, which the 
Supreme Court eventually accepted, but without sufficient reasoning. 
2. Similarity.  Having concluded that the work was entitled to an 
intermediate level of protection and was copyrightable as a whole, the 
analysis might have then moved to actually applying that “more 
discerning” standard to examine what exactly the defendant had 
copied and its quantitative and qualitative significance.390 Here, it 
seems likely that the Second Circuit’s focus on the quantity of the 
defendant’s appropriation would have been insufficient because the 
similarity prong necessitates a holistic comparison of the works and 
an examination of whether the appropriation was of the substance 
and value of the protected work. 
As noted earlier, substance and value are not always 
synonymous with the most original or creative parts of the work, but 
can instead derive from the parts of the work that are most heavily 
infused with the author’s personality, judgment, or effort.391 Using the 
similarity prong in this fashion would have allowed the court to deal 
directly with the fact that the defendant had indeed copied the 
“heart” of the plaintiff’s work, even though that “heart” was not 
individually copyrightable, being factual in nature. The conflict 
between the lower courts on the question of copyrightability—which 
the Supreme Court simplistically referred to as one that revolved 
around “originality”—might have been usefully resolved by 
recognizing that variables independent of the standard utilitarian 
ones can and do enter the equation during the similarity analysis, and 
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that this is far from giving the plaintiff a monopoly over otherwise 
uncopyrightable material because the inquiry and protection at this 
stage are entirely relational. 
It is hard to know how exactly a court might have come out on 
the similarity analysis, given its structure as a factual determination. 
The Supreme Court is likely to have found for the plaintiffs under this 
formulation too, given how heavily it weighed the material actually 
copied. This is in contrast to the Second Circuit, which emphasized 
the quantitative rather than the qualitative dimension—perhaps 
erroneously. On balance, though, the similarity analysis is likely to 
have come out in favor of the plaintiffs under the substantial-
similarity analysis, principally as a result of the defendant’s copying of 
the “essence” of the memoir. The plaintiffs were thus likely to have 
shown the existence of a prima facie entitlement, even if not a 
particularly robust one. 
3. Fair Use.  Should the court have found the plaintiffs to have a 
prima facie entitlement after all, then the defendant’s fair-use 
argument does become central. Note that unlike the actual opinions 
in the case, in the substantial-similarity analysis, a court would reach 
the fair-use stage only after confirming that the plaintiff does indeed 
have a valid exclusionary entitlement of some thickness, and that the 
defendant’s copying is similar to the plaintiff’s work when seen 
through the measure of thickness warranted by the work. Given what 
the court is likely to have examined in the previous two steps, the fair-
use analysis becomes significantly more streamlined, and it can 
legitimately focus on the defendant’s side of things, rather than on 
rehashing the plaintiff’s entitlement all over again. 
The second fair-use factor—the “nature” of the protected 
work—may be disregarded because its content was effectively 
adjudicated during the thickness inquiry.392 Similarly, on the third fair-
use factor—the “amount and substantiality” of the taking—the court 
could now examine this to contextualize the defendant’s copying. It 
would thus examine the amount taken as a proportion of the 
defendant’s—and not the plaintiff’s—work.393 The Second Circuit 
adopted precisely this approach.394 For the Second Circuit’s 
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reformulation to have been meaningful, though, the analysis of the 
significance of the appropriation needs to have already been 
completed; this analysis had not been undertaken in Harper & Row. 
The substantial-similarity analysis, on the other hand, does this under 
its similarity prong, rendering the reformulation of the third factor 
necessary in order to avoid a redundancy. This leaves us with the two 
remaining fair-use factors—both of which the court might have used 
to examine the defendant’s actions more closely in terms of its 
motivations and effects. 
Once again it is hard to predict what the outcome is likely to 
have been, owing to the detail-rich nature of the dispute and the 
multiple moving parts. At the very least, the Court might have 
adopted a far more streamlined approach to fair use, focusing 
exclusively on the defendant’s copying and conduct, and would have 
weighed the defendant-side factors against each other, without having 
to intersperse the analysis with details about the plaintiff’s 
entitlement—something that served to create an added layer of 
complexity and confusion in the Court’s actual opinion in Harper & 
Row. 
*  *  * 
In summary then, it is not clear that a court would have 
necessarily reached a different outcome in Harper & Row using the 
two-step substantial-similarity analysis. It is, however, very likely that 
a court would have been forced to pay closer attention to copyright’s 
underlying analytical framework and separate the plaintiff’s prima 
facie entitlement from the defendant’s actions in its analysis before 
deciding the case. In so doing, the Court could have stayed clear of its 
lofty rhetoric about copyright’s purposes or its structure as a 
“marketable” “property” right—assertions that seemed to play no 
role other than obfuscating the overall analysis.395 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars and courts remain divided over the fundamental 
questions of whether and to what extent copyright is a form of 
property or whether it is instead an entitlement more closely aligned 
with tort law. And yet, neither side has paid sufficient attention to the 
precise analytical structure of the copyright entitlement to shed light 
on these questions. Copyright law’s emphasis on copying remains a 
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rich and underappreciated source of normativity for the institution. 
Specifically, the inquiry into the wrongfulness of such copying under 
the rubric of substantial similarity affords courts the opportunity to 
calibrate a plaintiff’s entitlement to the peculiarities of the work in 
question, and then instantiate protection relationally by examining 
the defendant’s conduct and its relationship to the plaintiff’s 
entitlement. Beyond its obvious flexibility, its structure as a 
conceptually sequenced mechanism also renders the entitlement-
delineation process pluralistic, allowing it to incorporate both 
utilitarian and rights-based considerations into the determination. 
Discussions of copyright’s entitlement structure have come to 
focus primarily on its statutory dimensions. Indeed, reform initiatives 
in the area look primarily to Congress for instantiation.396 To the 
extent that courts and the common-law process are thought to have a 
role in the institution, they are relegated to the all-encompassing fair-
use doctrine. All of these discussions ignore the fundamental role of 
courts and the common-law method in shaping copyright’s prima 
facie entitlement via the doctrine of substantial similarity, an idea 
that—in principle, at least—applies to the vast majority of copyright 
cases and, not surprisingly, finds no mention whatsoever in the 
copyright statute. 
Reformulating copyright’s substantial-similarity inquiry in the 
manner argued for here would serve two immediate purposes. First, it 
would solve much of the confusion associated with the idea of 
substantial similarity that has in turn encouraged calls for its complete 
annihilation. It would in the process reveal that there is indeed a 
perfectly rational method in the ostensible madness of the idea, one 
worth preserving and developing. Second, it would force courts to 
engage more directly with copyright’s goals, purposes, and analytical 
structure as equal partners in the copyright-law-making exercise—a 
dynamic that sadly enough, seems to have been all but lost. 
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